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The use of illicit substances in South Africa has implications for the health and well-being of both the user 
and society at large. Improved data on the markets for illicit psychostimulants are imperative for 
supporting policy efforts to manage their use and provide support structures for those affected. This thesis 
is one of the few detailed studies on the South African drug market using quantitative methods. It expands 
on what is known about illicit substance markets by addressing aspects of the following questions:  
(1) What is known about the nature and scope of the methamphetamine, methaqualone and heroin 
markets?  
(2) What is known about the characteristics of poly-substance consumers?  
(3) What does the sequential pattern of substance initiation look like?  
(4) Why do poly-substance consumers report different inter- and intra-regional drug prices?  
(5) What issues need further research? 
As a first step towards answering these questions, a dataset of 337 poly-substance users from the Western 
Cape was analysed. Survey participants were sampled using a respondent-driven sampling technique – an 
approach useful for sampling hidden populations and efficiently, adjusting for associated sampling bias. 
The study found that methamphetamine prices tend to fluctuate across a heterogeneous consumer base, 
with a significant discount paid by females who were observed, on average, to pay 25% less for this 
substance. Methaqualone has less variation across consumers but showed significant price dissimilarities 
between the two sites included in the analysis, with respondents from Greenpoint paying, on average, 18% 
higher prices. This indicates a lack of pricing information being shared between the two sites. Heroin 
showed variation across consumers, although the data on this substance were limited. Furthermore, the 
results show that substance markets operate differently across intra-city locations. The key rationale for 
this include high transit costs incurred by suppliers (as drugs cannot be transported openly), high search 
costs incurred by consumers and the prevalence of information asymmetries between regions. This study 
brings light and understanding to a traditionally hidden market and highly dangerous market; however, far 
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The consumer price of illicit substances around the world – amidst increased efforts in 
regulating illicit substances and their precursor substances, and advancements in law 
enforcement methods – has been paradoxically declining in real terms since the 1990s 
(United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], 2015; Collins, 2014; Reuter, 2013). 
The reasons provided for this decline include increased competition, reduced quality of the 
substances and potential corruption (Reuter, 2013). Furthermore, the impact of globalisation 
and the internet distribution of illicit substances has had an effect on the drug market, 
levelling price differentials between countries through improved information and product 
flows between dealers and consumers (UNODC, 2015; The Economist, 2016).  
Illicit substances harm the health and well-being of individual users as well as the 
communities where the use of such substances is widespread. They need to be understood in 
detail and carefully managed by policy-makers in order to mitigate the economic and societal 
costs incurred by their consumption and production. Historically, poor understanding of 
psychostimulant markets and the behaviour of consumers, and the absence of data, have 
resulted in ineffective policy and the aggravation of substance-induced societal and economic 
costs (Collins, 2014). The continuing dearth of literature on the subject is a result of the 
difficulties in obtaining data on hidden substance markets.  
This research seeks to contribute to a better understanding of the nature and scope of drug 
usage markets and drug demand, which in turn can enable the creation of better-informed 
drug policies tailored to the local context, which will be more effective. The context of this 
particular research is the Western Cape, South Africa – the province with the highest number 
of treatment admissions and drug-related arrests in the country (South African Police 
Services, 2016; Peltzer et al., 2010). The most recent iteration of the South African National 
Drug Master Plan (NDMP), approved by Cabinet on 26 June 201, states that “comprehensive 
and up-to-date data on the nature, extent and consequences of the use of drugs other than 
alcohol in South Africa are not available” (p. 40). The paucity of data continues, with only a 




To achieve a better understanding, this research aims to expand on the following five 
questions: 
(1) What is known about the nature and scope of the methamphetamine, 
methaqualone and heroin markets?  
(2) What is known about the characteristics of poly-substance consumers?  
(3) What does the sequential pattern of substance initiation look like?  
(4) Why do poly-substance consumers report different inter- and intra-regional drug 
prices? and,  
(5) What issues need further research? 
These questions are investigated using demand-side consumer data from three sites in the 
Western Cape. a novel sampling approach is implemented because of the difficulties of 
obtaining data from illicit substances users. The approach used leverages trust from social 
relationships to increase response rates. The demographic data from the sample is 
summarised and adjustments are made to estimate the demographic make-up of the broader 
poly-substance using population in the Western Cape. Heterogeneity among substance 
abusers is the basis for analysis of drug transactions by sub-group. This is performed by 
applying a series of bias-adjusted analyses with increasing complexity for each of 





2.1. Illicit substance use in South Africa 
Illicit psychostimulant substance use in South Africa has developed from the backdrop of a 
number of political and socioeconomic factors, such as apartheid’s oppressive system, 
extreme inequality, and a poor social welfare structure, among others. The distress resulting 
from such factors is commonly mitigated and suppressed by psychostimulant substance use 
(Lakhdar, 2013). Since the first democratic election in 1994, South Africa has become 
increasingly connected to the global economy through open trade linkages and the removal of 
economic sanctions put in place during apartheid (Faulkner and Loewald, 2008). This has 
benefited the South African economy by opening up domestic markets to international trade 
and financial flows that have facilitated economic growth and development. However, 
negative unintended consequences have also ensued. One such consequence is that the 
market has also opened up to illegitimate and illegal transactions and trade (Peltzer et al., 
2010).
Both as an advantageous location for trade, and as an emerging consumer market, South 
Africa has become an important interim destination for trafficking illegal substances from 
South America into Africa or South-East Asia (UNODC, 2015; Pithey and Parry, 2006). This 
channel for trade was historically concealed and far smaller, but as emerging economies 
become more open to trade, so too does the ease by which illegal substances are able to be 
distributed to or through their nations increase (UNODC, 2015). South Africa’s opportune 
location in the international distribution of psychostimulant substances is boosted by 
structural factors such as a favourable location for ease of trade, porous border controls, an 
overburdened criminal justice system, existent trade linkages, a modern telecommunications 
and banking system, and socio-anthropological factors such as large diasporas, embedded 
criminal networks, and visible forms of inequality (Goga, 2014; Pithey and Parry, 2006). In 
the early 2000s in South Africa, a rapid expansion in the drug economy took place and with it 
came the rise of newer drugs such as methamphetamine (Pithey and Parry, 2006). It has been 
observed that South Africa has since developed into the leading market for illicit substances 
in the Southern African region (UNODC, 2005; UNODC, 2002).  
It is likely that drug usage and availability have increased due to the additional pressures 
placed on society by modernisation and the disruption of traditional family structures (Peltzer 




found to be common reasons cited for initiating drug-use behaviour (Hobkirk et al., 2016).  
Unemployed populations and those employed in low-quality jobs tend to show a high 
prevalence of substance abuse (Hobkirk et al., 2016; Peltzer et al., 2010) and the relationship 
between unemployment and drug-use is self-reinforcing and, therefore, extremely difficult to 
break free from (Henkel, 2011). When unemployment becomes embedded as the de facto 
lifestyle of many people, illegal substances become both a potential economic resource and a 
psycho-social pivot point. Additionally, it appears that individuals are seeking treatment for 
drug abuse at an increasingly early age (Peltzer et al., 2010). Hobkirk et al. (2014) find that 
youth were particularly lured by the appeal of psychostimulant use because of the lack of 
opportunities for further education, employment and general boredom. This is a concerning 
finding in light of the self-reinforcing unemployment effect and the disquieting 
unemployment rate among the youth of South Africa of 67.3% (Statistics South Africa, 
2016).  
In addition to unemployment, there are a number of other social ills which are generally 
correlated with high levels of substance use and abuse. The state of drug abuse in South 
Africa appears to be worsening, with the associated negative implications of poor health, 
safety risks, environmental risks, low productivity and weak governance, as well as an 
increased burden placed on the State for law enforcement and medical health care (Howell, 
2015; Peltzer, 2010; Watt, 2014).  
Howell et al. (2015) observed that drug-related arrests in South Africa are on the rise and are 
estimated to have increased by 181.6 % between 2004 and 2014. Data from the South African 
Police Service indicate that the Western Cape recorded the most drug-related arrests in the 
country (33.2%) which, while not directly indicative of usage trends, provides a strong 
indication of the prevalence of drug use in the province (South African Policy Service, 2016). 
An exponential increase has also been observed since 1994 in the demand for drug-related 
treatment (Peltzer et al., 2010), as well as a shift in preferences for drug type. Most notable 
has been the rapid increase in methamphetamine as the primary drug of use since its initial 




2.2. Substance profiles 
For the purpose of this research, the focus is narrowed to three substances: 
methamphetamine, methaqualone and heroin. These substances are associated with major 
health risks and their use remains highly stigmatised in South Africa. Drugs such as 
marijuana, which are only associated with minor health risks, are excluded because of the 
complexity surrounding quality and variety of species available. There are a multitude of 
marijuana strains available in South Africa, with a wide range of intended and unintended 
effects. This variation makes it difficult to include marijuana under one umbrella category to 
represent all varietals. Additionally, marijuana is seen to be more socially acceptable than 
other substances and is not policed in the same way (Howell, et al., 2015). However, while 
excluded from this research, it should be noted that there is widespread use and production of 
marijuana in South Africa. According to treatment centre data, it is estimated that marijuana 
is the most common primary substance used in South Africa (UNODC, 2014; Peltzer et al., 
2010)  and that the country is the third largest producer of the substance globally (Peltzer et 
al. , 2010).
2.2.1. Methamphetamine 
Methamphetamine is an illicit psychostimulant substance that, when consumed, produces a 
feeling of increased energy and euphoria for users of the substance (Paneka, et al 2013). In 
impoverished settings it has been found to have a high addictive potential. Regular use can 
lead to severe health problems such as extreme weight loss, tooth decay, and 
cardiopulmonary complications, as well as an array of mental health problems (Watt, 2014). 
International studies have found that markets for methamphetamine tend to rely heavily on 
social relationships. Consumers typically buy from dealers whom they know within 
residential properties (Rodriguez et al., 2005). It has also been noted that women are more 
susceptible to the misuse of methamphetamine than men and tend to become reliant on the 
substance far quicker (Lopez, 2009). 
Methamphetamine is also known as ‘tik’ in South Africa due to the ticking sound made when 
the crystals are heated. Literature suggests that, towards the end of 2005, methamphetamine 
had eclipsed the use of alcohol in terms of popularity in the Western Cape province, and it 
was also found that the many users were under the age of 20 (Morris and Parry, 2006). 
Subsequently, a rapid rise in the use of methamphetamine in the Western Cape has been 






Methaqualone, also known as ‘mandrax’, is a non-barbiturate sedative which was initially 
thought to be non-addictive and was sold with only basic prescription requirements for the 
relief from insomnia. However, around the 1970s, the use of the drug for non-medical 
purposes escalated and users started to report dependence to the substance (Tennant, 1973). 
The drug is usually taken in combination with another substance, such as alcohol or 
marijuana, to increase the resultant ‘high’ (Tennant, 1973). 
Africa was reported to be the largest market for methaqualone in 2005, with the substance 
being both produced locally and imported (Odejude, 2006). Around that time, it was the 
second most popular drug in South Africa (Parry et al., 2004). The substance induces feelings 
of relief from tension, anxiety and stress in the consumer (UNODC, 2003). It is sold in tablets 
which are typically crushed and is also frequently smoked together with cannabis (Odejude, 
2006; Parry et al., 2004). This combination gives a short-lived rush, including delusions and 
hallucinations, alongside a loss of bodily control, paraesthesias and the extended feeling of 
being intoxicated (Odejude, 2006; Tennant, 1973).  
2.2.3. Heroin 
Heroin, a type of opioid, is thought to be the cause of a larger number of fatalities than any 
other drug since overdosing is relatively easy (UNODC, 2010). The substance has a high 
potential for addiction and users experience a rush that comes with a feeling of absence of the 
mind (Fitzgerald et al. 1999). The substance is injected and is associated with diseases spread 
through the transmission of viruses through the blood stream; examples include HIV/AIDS 
and Hepatitis C (UNODC, 2010). 
Heroin was not easily accessible in the South African market until after 1994 when the 
country became more open to international markets, and the its use has been increasing since 
then (van Heerden et al., 2009). Initially, the substance was very expensive, which precluded 
the low-income and youth customer segments from purchasing it, but the nominal price has 
remained flat since the 1990s, resulting in greater access as real prices declined (Peltzer et al., 
2010). Data now show that the percentage of treatment admissions for heroin has been 




2.3. The result of ineffective psychostimulant substance management 
The cost to society of the ineffective management of psychostimulant substances as a result 
of health problems is exacerbated by the overburdened public health resources, which now 
sees disproportionate numbers of overdose patients and increased transmission of blood-
borne viral infections. Examples include the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and 
hepatitis. There is a potential link between drug use and child maltreatment, although the 
extent of the causality is not fully defined (Barth et al., 2006). The increased burden of the 
foster-care, as well as medical care for mental health issues resulting from neglect, place 
further costs on the nation’s health system.  
Secondly, there is the issue of public safety costs resulting from increased rates of criminal 
activity associated with illicit substance use (Chandler et al., 2009). These costs may also 
include safety risks associated with drug usage, such as driving under the influence of drugs 
(INCJ, 2007).  
There are also significant environmental risks associated with the manufacturing and disposal 
of psychostimulants (Pal et al., 2013; Zuccato and Castiglioni, 2009; INCJ, 2007). Chemical 
by-products from manufacturing, and chemicals in human waste, contaminate surface and 
ground water and put other humans and animals at risk. Contaminant levels, in fact, may 
provide information on the level of community consumption of illicit substances (Zuccato 
and Castiglioni, 2009; Bones, et al., 2007). Furthermore, the illegal cultivation of plant-based 
ingredients for drugs tends to result in deforestation and land degradation arising from poor 
farming techniques (Fjeldså et al., 2005). This is predominantly the case with rural 
cultivation. However, it is has been observed in some countries that urban cultivation of 
drugs is also degrading the neighbouring environment and results in a decreased quality of 
life, and therefore, of property values in neighbouring areas (INCJ, 2007).  
The issue of decreased labour productivity is also of concern for economies where drug use is 
widespread (Shield et al., 2015). Loss of productivity arises as a result of an increase in the 
likelihood of illness and lowers employability. Individuals using drugs, and participating in 
the labour force, have been observed to have higher rates of absenteeism, lower productivity 
on the job and higher safety risks (Frone, 2008). In addition, there is a loss of productivity 
associated with incarceration. In the United States, the value of lost productivity due to drug 




2.4. Policy and regulation 
Previously, the idea of a ‘drug-free world’ was pursued, the result of which is that policy 
makers actively aimed at a complete eradication of the supply and distribution of illicit 
substances. Currently, restrictions and regulations on the inputs of production of illicit 
substances are thought to influence the price of these substances by constricting supply. 
Trade restrictions and regulations on inputs are used to burden suppliers bringing the 
products to the market. Enforcement is expected to influence negatively both the demand for 
and supply of these substances, since it makes production and trading increasingly difficult, 
and it may also discourage users from consuming the illicit substances for fear of prosecution 
(Caulkins, 2014). Even for the rational consumer, increasing price by restricting supply is 
expected to deter consumption to a degree; however, the goal of reducing consumption to 
zero through prohibition is unrealistic. Importantly, appropriate policy approaches are likely 
to have varying effectiveness across countries and illicit substance markets (Caulkins, 2014). 
Collins (2014) explains how, according to theoretical economic dynamics, reducing supply 
has the potential to induce expansionary effects for the illicit substance industries. Since there 
is relative ease of entry and exit for merchants, reducing supply in the short term will increase 
prices temporarily, which incentivises new sellers to enter the market. Over time this will 
crowd-in in more suppliers, and eventually the market will return to the original equilibrium 
value. This effect is expected to be intensified for addictive substances since it is argued that 
users are likely to have relatively inelastic demand curves as they will typically continue to 
consume these goods, regardless of price increases, while reducing consumption of other 
goods.  
While theoretically plausible, there is very little rigorous evidence available to support this. 
Prohibition has been, and continues to be, an effective mechanism for keeping wholesale and 
retail prices high which reduces the quantity of prohibited substances consumed. 
Nevertheless, the cost of prohibition is extremely high, and the benefits engendered do not 
always outweigh the costs (Caulkins, 2014). 
Alternative policy options to prohibition are sometimes proposed and tested around the 
world. These include decriminalisation with taxation (Becker, Murphy and Grossman, 2004); 
harm reduction strategies, and demand reduction strategies (Cockayne and Walker, 2015). An 
evidence-based approach is proposed to ensure that policies are effective for a nation’s local 




2.4.1. South Africa’s drug policy 
South Africa’s current drug policy is outlined in the National Drug Master Plan (NDMP) 
2013 – 2017, and implementation of the policies therein is undertaken by the Central Drug 
Authority (CDA) in terms of the Prevention and Treatment of Drug Dependence Act (20 of 
1992) and the Prevention of and Treatment for Substance Abuse Act (70 of 2008).  
The previous National Drug Master Plan focused on the criminalisation and prohibition of all 
aspects of the value chain for illicit substances. This approach has subsequently fallen out of 
favour with many academics and policy-makers because of the aforementioned imbalance 
between the costs and resultant benefits (Cockayne and Walker, 2015; Caulkins, 2014). The 
current policy is in line with the shift towards the use of a threefold strategy of demand 
reduction, supply reduction and harm reduction.  
Demand-reduction strategies refer to actions which reduce the need for illicit substance use 
by potential end-consumers. This can be done through one or more of the following: poverty 
alleviation, economic development, education, the provision of alternative substances to 
reduce drug dependence (Anderson and Kearney, 2000), and psychosocial development 
(Patel, 2006). Supply reduction targets the availability of illegal substances as well as their 
precursor chemicals for manufacture. In the case of illicit substances, this may take the form 
of drug seizures, border controls, crop destruction and manufacturing and distribution centre 
closures. The restricted supply is thought to increase the price and discourage use, although 
there is very little evidence on the effectiveness of this intervention (Strang et al., 2012). 
Harm reduction moderates the damage psychostimulant substances causes to users and 
communities. This may include reshaping drug markets towards less harmful practices, 
improving access to treatment, and the rehabilitation and re-integration of substance abusers 
into society (Caulkins and Reuter, 2010). 
The revised NDMP applies these three strategies in its framework and is a vast improvement 
upon the more punitive approach applied prior to 2013. One significant improvement of the 
policy is that it has shifted the focus from national interventions to those at a local level, 
targeting communities which are identified as being highly vulnerable (Howell and Couzyn, 
2015; Geyer and Lombard, 2014). The revised NDMP involves numerous stakeholders in the 
process of mitigating drug abuse and substance-related crimes. These stakeholders include: 
government departments, the private sector, and special interest groups. Furthermore, there is 




interventions. Previously, the only outcome measured was the number of actions taken, but 
the efficacy of the intervention remained unknown. Four areas will be monitored under the 
new policy, including performance, organisational capacity, financial performance and 
community needs (NDMP, 2013; Howell and Couzyn, 2015).  
While there are significant improvements from the previous NDMP, the structure of the 
document is fragmented, overly ambitious and lacks a clear implementation strategy to take 
the intended policies to the population. A critique of the NDMP framework by Howell and 
Couzyn (2015) concludes that the plan is full of “internal inconsistencies and impractical 
resolutions”, making its policies difficult to apply. The root of the problem is that the plan 
appears to take a reformed view of drug control policies, in line with current global thinking, 
but there are no practical steps to move the system as a whole in this direction. In addition, 
the involvement of multiple entities in the implementation of the policy has the potential to 
allow for a loophole to be created, where government itself is absolved from being held to 
account in the event of failure (Howell and Couzyn, 2015). The authors show that drug policy 
reforms are likely to merely be lip-service and stakeholders involved in the implementation 
are likely to find the policies challenging to apply. The criminal justice system will, in all 
likelihood, continue play a central role in drug enforcement and policing in South Africa, as it 
did under the NDMP (2013-2017). 
3. Applying economic principles to the market for illicit 
substances 
Studies on illicit psychostimulant substance use and abuse encompass a variety of disciplines 
and analytical methods for the common goal of understanding the manner in which people 
use and produce these substances. These include disciplines such as ethnography, 
psychology, epidemiology, criminology, public health, and economics (Ritter, 2006). The 
variety in approaches has resulted in a diverse, yet unsystematic, knowledge base for 
understanding drug use behaviour, making policy and intervention design a complex 
endeavour. Ritter (2006) concludes by stating that “the area of illicit drug markets is ripe for 
inter- and trans-disciplinary endeavours” (pp. 461) and that such approaches may be able to 
“transcend disciplinary boundaries in search of new knowledge” (pp.461). The approach 
taken in this current study is primarily based on the discipline of economics, and the literature 




review to include multiple disciplines; therefore, elements of ethnography and criminology 
also feature prominently.   
The following review of the relevant literature synthesises elements of the structure of the 
drug supply value chain, the economics of drug demand and supply, the sensitivity of 
consumer demand, and the importance of individual transactions, and concludes with a note 
on the complexity of studying drug markets. 
3.1. The demand and supply of illicit substances 
The economic approach to analysing the drug consumers and producers operates under the 
assumption that illegal markets behave, in many ways, similarly to legal markets for goods 
and services (Collins, 2014; Ritter, 2006; Caulkins, 2006). Theory of the firm (Levitt and 
Venkatesh, 2000) and demand-supply interactions have been observed to be able to capture 
some of the characteristics of the illicit psychostimulant market (Caulkins, 2006; Ritter, 2006; 
Moore et al., 2005). The discipline of economics is particularly convenient for studying 
markets of illicit goods, due to its rigorous taxonomy of market structures and associated 
theories. This provides an organised framework in which to coordinate a relatively chaotic 
body of work (Ritter, 2006). However, in many cases there are deviations from the 
elementary market conditions resulting in interesting but unexpected outcomes (Caulkins and 
Reuter, 2006). 
One of the primary deviations from traditional markets is the idea of rational, self-interested 
agents with lexicographic preferences – also referred to as homo economicus – which is often 
assumed in theoretical models, but seldom observed in empirical data of illicit substances 
user behaviour (Bowles and Gintis, 1993). Departures from the theory of consumer 
optimisation occur in most markets for products and services, and may be heightened for 
consumer behaviour in the market for illicit substances (Beckert and Wehinger, 2013; 
Sandberg, 2012; Caulkins, 2006; Coomber, 2003). Furthermore, even suppliers of illicit 
substances have been observed to behave in a manner entirely unreflective of profit-
maximising behaviour (Sandberg, 2012; Caulkins and MacCoun, 2003; Levitt and 
Venkatesh, 2000).  
A further dissimilarity which distinguishes the economic analysis of illegal psychostimulant 
markets from the economic analysis of normal goods is the centrality of an unobserved 
quality to the product (Caulkins, 2006) which results in something similar to Akerlof’s (1970) 




such as drugs, is not observable by the consumer until they consume it and consumers cannot 
request a refund once consumed. Furthermore, poor quality is not uncommon owing to the 
practice of diluting, or cutting, drugs with cheaper substances (Lakhdar, 2013). 
Nonetheless, economic theory remains useful for understanding the market for drugs, 
although inconsistencies ought to be considered. Firstly, the value chain from cultivation to 
production to distribution is similar to that of a traditional corporate firm. The structure of the 
‘firm’ or the supply behaviour is relatively unknown, but has been clarified to some degree 
through studies such as that of Caulkins et al. (1999) and Levitt and Venkatesh (2000). These 
authors observed a hierarchical supply chain structure with some central leaders and 
‘traffickers’ coordinating the supply chain, which culminates in street sale transactions 
performed by foot-soldiers, entrepreneurs or dealers. Dealers are more easily identified in this 
chain because they make their livelihood selling drugs in public places. Dealers typically sell 
in small quantities to end-consumers, obtaining their wares on either consignment terms, in 
exchange for a salary, or from suppliers in order to trade independently (Caulkins et al., 
1999).  
The framework of supply and demand in economics also provides a convenient framework 
for interpreting market outcomes, such as the drug price and consumer behaviour. Many 
authors have noted that the market price of psychostimulant substances is largely determined 
by similar market forces as the market price for licit goods (Reuter & Haaga, 1989; Ritter, 
2006). Furthermore, this framework provides a theoretical backdrop to any attempt to 
determine causality between a drug policy and any subsequent shift in drug market outcomes 
(Reuter, 2010).   
The fundamentals of the discipline of economics are formed upon the assumption of a 
capitalistic market in which prices are a function of the relationship between quantities 
demanded and supplied. When the quantity demanded is in excess of supply, price typically 
rises; conversely, when the quantity demanded is exceeded by supply, prices tend to drop. In 
essence, markets play catch-up towards equilibrium, where the quantity supplied is 
equivalent to the quantity demanded (Henderson, 1922). Shifting the market away from its 
equilibrium state requires a change, or ‘shock’, in one or more external factors which 
influence suppliers or consumers. In the medium term, once markets are given sufficient time 
to adjust, negative shocks to supply, such as an increase in input price, theoretically increase 




to the market, provided all other factors remain the same. Negative shocks to demand, such as 
a shift in tastes and preferences away from a particular product, should theoretically reduce 
the equilibrium quantity demanded and, once markets have adjusted, increase the price 
(Henderson, 1922). These shocks and their subsequent impact on market equilibrium are 
relatively well understood, albeit that ceteris paribus does not hold in real life, in the market 
for normal goods. However, in the market for illicit goods, the appearance of shocks and the 
mechanism by which they affect price and consumption is relatively less understood and, 
therefore, various methods have been applied to the limited data available on illicit markets, 
in an attempt to map the mechanisms by which supply and demand of these goods can be 
altered.  
3.2. Illicit substance elasticities 
The extent of positive and negative shocks to the quantity demanded is commonly 
determined through a calculation of the elasticity of demand, which is a measure of how 
sensitive consumers are to changes in the price of a particular product. Inelastic demand 
implies that consumers do not significantly change the quantity of a particular product or 
service which they consume when that product or service changes price. Elastic demand 
implies that consumers are very sensitive to price changes and will significantly change the 
quantity of a particular product or service consumed when there are changes in the price of 
that product or service.   
For highly stigmatised drugs such as methamphetamine and some opioids, the calculated 
demand elasticity is consistently negative across a number of studies, although the extent of 
the responsiveness - whether price elasticity of demand is elastic or inelastic - varies across 
studies (Olmstead et al., 2015; Saffer and Chaloupka 1999; Roddy and Greenwal, 2009; 
Ramful and Zhao 2009; Chalmers, Bradford and Jones, 2009; Bretteville-Jensen, 2006). The 
addictive property of these substances has been hypothesised to result in asymmetric 
elasticities being observed where the responsiveness to price is higher for declining prices 
than for increasing prices (Bretteville-Jensen, 2011). 
In a study conducted in Australia, Marijuana - a socially ubiquitous substance - has been 
shown to be price inelastic at present prices for the overall consumer base, but significantly 
elastic for poly-substance drug users who also consume marijuana. The rationale for this is 




multitude of drugs in their consumption portfolio, as they are likely to be more dependent on 
‘hard’ drugs, which are typically more addictive (Ramful and Zhao, 2009). 
The overall reduction in the quantity demanded for a particular illicit substance as prices 
increase is potentially due to a net reduction in consumption, but may also be a result of a 
substitutionary effect. Consumers potentially substitute their consumption of one substance 
with another (Chalmers, Bradford and Jones, 2009) or find more efficient means of 
consumption; for example, by obtaining psychoactive effects through injecting heroin as 
opposed to smoking it (Bretteville-Jensen, 2011).  
Cross-price elasticity measures the responsiveness in quantity demanded of one product to a 
change in the relative price another product. Few studies have measured cross-price elasticity 
of the demand for various drugs and their results differ based on which two drugs are being 
compared. Whether poly-drug users consume a plurality of drugs in a substitutionary or 
complementary manner is unclear from available determinations of the cross-price elasticity 
of demand (Bretteville-Jensen, 2011; Chalmers Bradford and Jones, 2009; Saffer and 
Chaloupka, 1999).  
The variation in elasticities between studies is likely to be a result of difficulties in obtaining 
sound, comparable data on drug use and production, as well as the differences prevalent in 
the demand behaviour across consumer groups (Caulkins 2006, Lahaie et al, 2014). This 
behaviour is influenced by a combination of inconsistent behaviour among drug suppliers 
(Coomber, 2003) and asymmetrical information between transacting agents (Dwyer and 
Moore, 2010). 
In addition to the aforementioned elasticities, a further indicator that is of interest in studies 
of illicit substance consumption is the participation elasticity. This indicator is also frequently 
used in labour economics to determine a change in the participation rate of the labour force 
with respect to a shift in factors affecting wage rates (Eissa, Kleven, and Kreiner, 2008). The 
participation elasticities for illicit substances provide the change in initiation rates as a result 
of price shifts, decriminalisation, and penalty implementation or enforcement. The initiation 
of marijuana use and the use of ‘hard’ drugs has been observed to be negatively influenced by 
a shift in the price of heroin (Ramful and Zhao, 2009; Saffer and Chaloupka, 1999). Pacula et 
al. (2010) summarises the participation elasticity of marijuana use for a shift in price, 
decriminalisation, and penalties and their enforcement. Penalties and decriminalisation were 




(Pacula et al., 2010). Participation elasticities for addictive substance are limited in that it is 
not possible to separate the effect of an increase in first-time users from a reduction in 
‘quitters’ (Bretteville-Jensen, 2011); however, studies using duration models that are able to 
account for the two factors have resulted in findings similar to studies using simple 
participation elasticities (van Ours and Williams, 2007; Melberg et al., 2010). 
3.3. Initiation into the illicit substance economy 
It is important to understand the determinants of psychostimulant substances in order to curb 
demand, and more specifically, youth psychostimulant use. Six major contextual factors 
influence the use of these substances, namely: drug availability, the norms around drug use, 
the availability of socio-economic opportunities (Hobkirk et al., 2016; Norman et al, 2010), 
educational environment, and individual and family factors (UNODC, 2015). 
The availability of psychostimulant substances has been shown to influence the decision to 
begin consuming these substances (Hobkirk et al, 2016; Caulkins, 2014). This finding has 
been the foundation for many policies aimed at reducing the supply of psychostimulant 
substances so as to curb the use and, thereby, diminish associated harms to society (Moore, 
1990; Reuter and Kleinman, 1986). These policies have recently fallen out of favour due to 
their high cost with limited effectiveness and even harm to society (Collins, 2014). Reasons 
for the limited effectiveness may include the other drivers of drug initiation, which perpetuate 
the use of drugs despite supply-side enforcement.  
Qualitative studies, aimed at understanding the attitudes of drug users, note that a desire to 
‘fit in’, or influence from friends, partners or even family, may also catalyse the process of 
drug initiation (Anderson, 2001; Hobkirk et al., 2016). Social norms and the acceptance of 
illicit behaviour make it more acceptable to initiate drug consumption behaviour. A number 
of studies also show that psychostimulant substance initiation for many users is for the 
purpose of mitigating trauma or distress (UNODC, 2015; Lakhdar, 2013; Norman et al, 
2010). 
The lack of socio-economic opportunities, such as employment, educational institutions and 
recreational facilities, are also major contributing factors to the use of illicit substances. A 
developmental approach to drug use prevention seeks to control drug consumption through a 
targeted improvement in the aforementioned areas. This approach is gaining popularity and 
there is an initial body of evaluation work indicating the potential for success using this 




Initiation of drug use differs between individuals and has been noted to differ particularly 
along gender lines. Women tend to begin using illicit substances later than males (UNODC, 
2015) and their drug careers are more likely to be initiated through their relationships with 
men (Anderson, 2001). Bretteville-Jensen (1999) disaggregates the elasticity of demand for 
drugs by gender and found that females also tend to have a higher price elasticity of demand 
than males. The differences are thought to occur because of the way women are viewed in 
society, as well as the dissimilarities in opportunities afforded to women in comparison to 
men (Anderson, 2001). 
Kandel et al. (1992) theorised that there is an underlying pattern which describes how drugs 
are initiated. This pattern of initiation tracks a pathway through the various categories of 
drugs. The authors suggest that substance users begin with the use of licit substances (alcohol 
and cigarettes), then progress to marijuana – a more socially acceptable substance – then to 
illicit drugs other than marijuana and, finally, to medically-prescribed drugs. This was termed 
the ‘gateway effect’. Individuals using ‘hard’ drugs are thought to have been introduced 
firstly to substances that are not as harmful as hard drugs and are more easily accessed. 
However, there is the potential for other factors such as gender, age of initiation, frequency of 
use and even hidden factors such as ‘unobservable propensity towards substance abuse’ to 
influence whether or not an individual initiates hard drug consumption (Kandel et al., 1992; 
Yamaguchi and Kandel, 1984). This theory has subsequently been contested.  
Although socially acceptable substances such as tobacco and marijuana have been shown to 
be significant predictors for later use of more stigmatised substances, the causality of this 
effect remains unclear (Phillips, 2015; Fergusson, Boden and Horwood, 2006; Bullock et al., 
1998). Separating causality from correlation in this context proves to be extremely difficult. 
Using a multivariate analysis approach, it has been shown, in some cases, that marijuana use 
is a significant predictor for the initiation of harder drugs (DeSimone, 1998; Pacula 1998; 
Kenkel, Mathios and Pacula, 2001). Multistage approaches to this problem that account for 
unobserved heterogeneity also find evidence in support of the gateway drug theory 
(Bretteville-Jensen et al., 2005). However, Degenhardt et al. (2010) show that the gateway 
hypothesis may not be wholly representative of true initiation patterns and it is in fact the 




3.4. The role of one-on-one transactions and social capital 
It has been mentioned that individual factors have a significant role to play in the decision to 
initiate psychostimulant substance use (UNODC, 2015). The individual characteristics of 
drug consumers influence not only the decision to initiate, but also their negotiation and 
consumption behaviour (Lahaie et al., 2015). Furthermore, suppliers of illegal 
psychostimulants have the power to leverage price variations and information asymmetries to 
their advantage, and tend to do this on a customer-by-customer basis (Dwyer and Moore, 
2010). This potentially makes the market more efficient, as buyers are paying amounts closer 
to what they are willing to pay; in other words the market nears first-degree price 
discrimination (Stole, 2007). Therefore, the ability to understand the heterogeneity observed 
amongst drug consumers will bring us a step closer to understanding the drug market as a 
whole.   
Drug markets are unique in that sale transactions occur on a very personal basis with drug 
dealer and drug user interacting and negotiating deals in person. As Arlacchi (1998, pp.208) 
puts it, “illicit markets may be distinguished from licit markets by their failure to adopt 
impersonal forms or intentional communication and distribution of goods”. Individual 
interactions are also important in determining a price for the drug being sold, as observed in 
numerous studies, where observed prices fluctuate according to an underlying factor of the 
social relation between buyer and seller (Ouellet and Morselli, 2014; Dwyer and Moore, 
2010; Lopez et al., 2009; Bohnert et al., 2009; Coomber and Maher, 2006; Lee, 2004; 
Denton, 2001). Sellers have also been observed to deviate from profit-maximising behaviour 
to those whom they know are in less fortunate economic circumstances than themselves 
(McKenna, 2014; Dwyer and Moore, 2010). The ability to obtain more favourable terms of 
purchase is referred to as social capital throughout the remainder of this paper. Social capital 
is defined in a multitude of ways for different contexts. In the context of individual 
transaction between drug users and drug dealers, it can be defined as “a resource that actors 
derive from specific social structures and then use to pursue their interests; it is created by 
changes in the relationship among actors” (Baker 1990, p. 619). 
Aside from social capital, it has been found that quantity purchased is a major influencer of 
the final price paid at the individual transaction level (Lahaie et al. 2015; Caulkins and 
Padman, 1993). Authors observe as much as a 2.3% reduction in price for every 10% increase 
in the transaction (Lahaie et al., 2015). While bulk discounts may be available for certain 




This is typically due to cash constraints (especially in the case of impoverished consumers) or 
because a dealer was not willing to sell a larger quantity due to the risk of carrying large 
quantities in the context of law enforcement (Chalmers and Bradford, 2013).  
The illicit substance market is similar to Akerlof’s (1970) ‘market for lemons’ which explains 
the dynamics within a market where sellers have more information about the product being 
sold – in Akerlof’s case used cars –  than the buyer. In essence Akerlof shows how in such a 
market, sellers of poorer quality “lemons” maximise profits by claiming to sell a high quality 
product. Buyers, with the inability to observe quality, will be willing to pay an amount less 
than the value of the high quality product because they will factor into the price the risk that 
the product being purchased is of low quality. The resulting market price favours sellers of 
low quality products drives out sellers of high quality goods. Similarly in illicit substance 
markets buyers have no way of knowing the exact quality until the product has been 
consumed. In legal markets information asymmetries can be overcome by regulations and 
institutions, but due to the illegitimacy of drugs, purchasers cannot be protected from unfair 
pricing.  Price is, therefore, not a good indication of quality since it is in the best interest of 
dealers selling low purity drugs to take on the appearance of selling high purity drugs 
(Ouellet and Morselli, 2014; Caulkins and Padman, 1993). 
Another price gradient typically occurs between geographic regions. Caulkins (2006) argues 
that this is largely due to the inability of information on illegal goods to travel easily between 
regions, as well as to transport costs. This is not entirely dissimilar to markets for legal goods. 
As with oil and gas markets, drug prices have also been found to correlate positively to the 
distance from the supply source (Lahaie et al. 2014). The exaggerated barriers to information 
flows observed in markets for illicit goods may also contribute to the distinctness of price 
across regions (Caulkins, 2006). Price differentials in legal markets exist between countries 
and cities (Hassink and Shettkat, 2003), although there is opportunity for arbitrage over 
smaller distances.  
As previously mentioned, social relationships play a substantial role in the transactions 
between buyers and sellers of illicit goods. Dealers prefer to attract a customer base of good 
customers – those regularly purchasing and paying the asking price – and, therefore, offer 
different price schedules to these customers than to customers approaching a dealer 
intermittently (Dwyer and Moore, 2001). Repeat customers are, leading to a mutually 




Longstanding clients are favoured in order to overcome the problem of asymmetrical 
information present in the market for illicit substances (Lahaie et al., 2015; Ouellet and 
Morselli, 2014; Beckert and Wehinger, 2013; Chalmers and Bradford, 2013; Lakhdar, 2013; 
Dwyer and Moore, 2010; Coomber, 2003). Dealers prefer regular clients because of the 
reduced likelihood that these consumers are undercover law enforcement officials, violent or 
poor payers (Chalmers and Bradford, 2013; Dwyer and Moore, 2010; Coomber, 2003). It also 
allows dealers to sell their wares faster and with greater certainty, which allows for pre-
planning. For this reason, sellers may incur an upfront loss (for example, providing free drug 
samples of a high quality) to customers to assure them of a high-quality product (Lakhdar, 
2013). This behaviour is in line with Akerlof’s (1970) proposed solution to the ‘market for 
lemons’, which would involve a costly signal to the market to expose the quality of a seller’s 
product.  
Consumers concerned with issues of quality and price would also rather return to drug dealers 
they can trust when purchasing illicit substances (Dwyer and Moore, 2010). In a market 
where quality is important, yet unobserved, consumers can use longstanding relationships to 
provide greater certainty as to the quality of product they will receive. Furthermore, search 
costs for drugs dealers are high because of the enforcement and quality risks (Caulkins, 2006) 
and, therefore, efficient consumers locate a preferred dealer (often with a series of backups 
for when they are unavailable) and repeatedly return to them for future purchases (Lahaie et 
al., 2015; Chalmers and Bradford, 2013; Beckert, 2013). Their loyalty is typically rewarded 
with a more stable quality, priority access, better prices, offers of credit, and bulk discounts 
(Lahaie et al., 2015; Chalmers and Bradford, 2013; McKetin et al., 2005; Coomber, 2003). 
The importance of reciprocity is exaggerated for markets where agents are economically and 
socially vulnerable (McKenna, 2014). 
The transactional differentials occurring between groups are often a result of inefficiency 
mitigation discussed above. Certain observable characteristics have been identified by sellers 
as indicators of a likely ‘good’ customer exhibiting favourable behaviours such as on-time 
payments and peacefulness (Lakhdar, 2013). First, a consistent source of income is preferred 
because it increases the reliability of payment. This is especially important in drug markets 
located in impoverished areas. For example, sellers have been observed to compete for 
customers receiving regular social transfer payments (Anderson, 2005). These payments are 
often received by women. Furthermore, women are perceived to be less sporadic with their 




These factors combined make women favoured customers in many drug markets, as dealers 
assume if a potential customer is female that this is a signal for good customer behaviour (i.e. 
they pay on time and are non-violent(Anderson, 2005). 
3.4.1. Rationales for inconsistent prices 
To recapitulate, in the economic literature on the market for illicit substances, five key 
explanations for the inconsistencies in illicit substance purchase prices arise. First, that drug 
dealers are thought to charge higher prices on a transaction if they believe that the customer is 
not aware of the going price for a particular substance. Effectively there is a degree of price 
discrimination taking place where dealers, because of the one-on-one transactions, are able to 
extract a greater surplus from clients according to their willingness-to-pay (Dwyer and 
Moore, 2010; Stole, 2007). Secondly, there is evidence that dealers do not always act as 
perfectly rational profit-maximising agents. They are, in fact, commonly influenced by social 
relationships with their customers. Thirdly, there may be non-monetary costs which 
consumers incorporate in their willingness-to-pay. These costs may differ between 
individuals (Caulkins, 2006). Fourthly, some consumers may be able to negotiate more 
effectively than others (Lahaie et al., 2015). Lastly, consumers often use bartering tactics to 
obtain drugs. Therefore, the price may not include the full value transferred in exchange for 
illicit substances (Dwyer and Moore, 2010). 
3.5. Difficulties with drug-use data 
Due to the illicit nature of psychostimulants, obtaining accurate information from consumers 
or producers is very difficult and the risk of bias within the data is high. Social desirability 
bias is inescapable in drug-use studies (Van de Mortel, 2008; McGilloway and Connelly, 
2004), as well as the sampling bias resulting from uncovering hidden populations involved in 
illegal behaviour. While many purists may feel that this leaves studies with such data 
unworkable, others argue that there is a wealth of knowledge available in such studies, but 
that the data need to be approached carefully with bias-mitigation techniques, so as to avoid 
misinterpretation (Caulkins, 2006). 
4. Empirical data 
The empirical data upon which the findings of this research are based come from a multi-site, 
mixed-methods approach, which culminated in data sampling using RDS, to accessing hidden 




sampling process for the dataset used in the current research is outlined by Burnhams et al. 
(2016).  
Around the world, such data would usually be collected from arrestees or drug-users who 
seek treatment, which would result in innately biased samples since there is likely to be a 
pool of users who are never reached. Data on drug usage and prices are most commonly 
extracted from 1) undercover agents and informants – such as the United States Drug 
Enforcement Administration’s (DEA’s) System to Retrieve Information from Drug Evidence 
(STRIDE), 2) self-reported data from individuals in treatment centres, and 3) data from 
arrests and drug seizures (Caulkins, 2006). Notable selection bias is associated with all three 
of these techniques as is typical when sampling individuals involved in illegal or stigmatised 
activities, as potential respondents fear prosecution or further stigmatisation. To overcome 
this, sampling techniques have been developed that leverage the trust found in social 
relationships to overcome the inhibitions which potential respondents may have. This 
technique is broadly called chain referral sampling, as respondents refer other individuals 
from their networks to increase the sample size in a chain-like formation. One such chain 
referral technique is respondent-driven sampling (RDS) which is used in this research and 
discussed in more detail in the following section. 
4.1. Respondent-driven sampling 
The data sampling process used in this research is a respondent-driven sampling (RDS) 
process developed by Heckathorn (1997). This sampling process uses the recruitment of a set 
of known individuals (“seeds”) from a targeted population who are given incentives to recruit 
additional respondents from their social networks. The recruiting process repeats iteratively, 
with the recruited individuals then becoming the recruiters, until the desired sample size is 
reached (Shonlau and Liebau, 2012). The strength of the RDS approach is that it is able to 
mitigate the potential biases within the subsequent recruitment groups in a more efficient 
manner than other methods used in the research of hidden populations, such as snowball, key 
informant and targeted sampling (Heckathorn, 1997).  
During the initial seeding stage, respondents are selected using information about existing 
networks of drug users. The seeds represent a non-random sample since they all carry some 
trait making them identifiable to fieldworkers – usually as individuals who were arrested or 
treated. As an example, for samples of HIV-positive individuals, the initial seed may 




Therefore, the seeds all took active steps to find treatment for their illness and such an 
attitude may indicate someone with a greater desire to get well and who is more proactive 
about improving his or her situation. These respondents are also less likely to be secretive 
about belonging to the target population (Heckathorn, 1997). 
The social network of a drug user is important as it is the means by which users are initially 
exposed to the drug market and the use of drugs is continually influenced by an individual’s 
social network which continues to play an important role in accessing drugs (Ouellet and 
Morselli, 2014; Dwyer and Moore, 2010; Lopez et al., 2009; Coomber and Maher, 2006; 
Denton, 2001). A clear source of potential bias arises in that individuals with larger social 
networks have a greater likelihood of being included in the sample. For this reason, 
techniques are applied to mitigate the influence of network-size bias on the data sampling 
process (Shonlau and Liebau, 2012; Volz and Heckathorn, 2008; Heckathorn, 1997). A 
further source of bias arises from the tendency of respondents to recruit individuals who are 
similar to themselves. This is known as homophily bias.  
Solutions for deriving population proportions which moderate the effect of homophily bias 
make use of Markov chain theory to estimate the stochastic process underlying the 
recruitment outcomes. To illustrate this, in the situation where a population has two key sub-
populations, m and n, the likelihood of a recruiter in sub-population m recruiting individuals 
from either m or n can be estimated based on the number of times recruiters in group n recruit 
individuals from group m (S𝑛𝑚). Together with the following assumptions, the proportion of 
each sup-population in the broader population may then be estimated.  
There are five basic assumptions underlying the RDS analysis technique. The first 
assumption is that there is reciprocity, such that if individual n recruits individual m, that 
recruitment is just as likely to have occurred the other way around. The second assumption is 
that respondents are networked, as discussed above; this is likely to be the case as individuals 
use their network to source drugs.1 The third assumption is that respondents are able to report 
accurately on the size of their network within the target population. Fourthly, the RDS 
process assumes that there is random recruitment and that recruitment is efficient. Lastly, for 
the use of Markov chain theory, it is assumed that the value of any category group among 
                                                          
1 There is a third assumption of ‘sampling with replacement’; however, researchers suggest that this 




those recruited depends on the previous recruiter only (and not the recruiter’s recruiter). This 
simplifies the theoretical model to a single-period transition matrix which is used to model 
the recruitment process.  
In order to determine the number of links stemming from members of a category group, the 
number of respondents in that group (Ni) is multiplied by the average network size within that 
group (Di). The transition matrix is then created by using the proportion of linkages in group 
n of the sample that connect to individuals in group m (this is denoted by  S𝑛𝑚) and 
multiplying this by N𝑚D𝑚. The assumption of reciprocity implies that the number of links 
going from group m to group n is the same as the number of links going from group n to 
group m. 
(1)  N𝑚D𝑚S𝑚𝑛  =   N𝑛D𝑛S𝑛𝑚        
The above equation shows the total number of linkages between the two groups. Dividing 
both sides of (1) by the total number of individuals in the sample as a whole (N) gives: 
(2)  P𝑚D𝑚S𝑚𝑛  =   P𝑛D𝑛S𝑛𝑚 where   ∑ 𝑃𝑖
𝑁
𝑖  = 1 
P𝑚 and P𝑛 are the population proportions of group m and n respectively. In the case of only 
two category groups, the two equations with two unknowns can be solved in a relatively 
straightforward manner. In the case where there are more than two group categories, the 
system of equations is over-determined. Parameters can be estimated using either least 
squares or the data smoothing method detailed by Heckathorn (2002). For the two category 
case, (2) can be solved to give n’s population proportion: 




Equation (3) provides the basis for an estimator for population proportions which is 
calculated using the linkages between groups (S) and average network size per group (D). 





Equation (4) is used to estimate the population proportions of demographic groups of poly-




individual weights are given to each respondent to adjust for network-size bias. There is no 
basis for controlling for homophily bias in continuous data.  
To calculate the individual weights the following formula is used:  




Heckathorn (2007) shows how the above equation can be separated into a component 
controlling for recruitment between groups and a component controlling for network size.  









= 𝐷𝐶𝑥 ∙ 𝑅𝐶𝑥 
With this separation, the degree component (that controlling for network size) can be 
formulated based on a mechanism whereby individuals with high network sizes are expected 
to be oversampled and those with small networks under sampled. To mitigate for any 
oversampling due to an individual’s large network size, DCx would need to be deflated. The 
opposite applies to undersampling. The degree component is thus inversely related to 
network size.  
(7)  DC𝑖 = 𝐾 ∙
1
𝐷𝑖
, where K is a positive constant 
Substituting (7) into the original individual weight calculation (5) produces a multiplicity 
adjustment which can be used to mitigate the effect of network size. This weight is a function 
of an individual’s network size (Di) and a recruitment adjustment (where applicable).  




Heckathorn (2007) shows how the estimation of population proportions is equivalent when 
formulated at an individual or group level. For continuous data, adjustments due to cross-ties 
between groups are typically nonsensical. Because of this, only the degree adjustment is used. 
The estimated proportions using these weights are sometimes referred to as Volz-Heckathorn 
or RDS II estimated proportions.  
When using group level estimates (RDS I), Schonlau and Liebau (2012) recommend using 
bootstrap standard errors for use when calculating population proportions. For the analysis 
using the multiplicity adjustment, Sandwich (White) robust standard errors are used to 




decision to use weights is not straightforward and comes at the expense of precision 
(Ramirez-Valles et al., 2008). 
4.2. Data sampling process  
As a precursor to the data sampling process, focus group discussions (FDGs) were conducted 
with known poly-substance users in order to determine the feasibility of the RDS approach 
for the local context of the target population. The FDG participants were selected from three 
regions in the Western Cape, namely Delft, Greenpoint and Khayelitsha. The participants had 
to have resided in one of these areas for a minimum of one year to be eligible for the survey 
sample. They were also required to be self-identified poly-drug users and have used one of 
the six identified drugs upon which the study was based, in the past seven days. Use of 
psychostimulant substances within the past seven days was confirmed through biological 
verification. This approach has been successfully used in two previous studies of hidden 
population groups in South Africa (Kimani et al., 2014; Rispel et al., 2011). 
The second phase consisted of a field-worker assisted, computer-based survey with a larger 
sample group (n=337) that was recruited through a RDS process, using the FDG participants 
as the 12 initial seeds. The overall coupon response rate – the proportion of distributed 
coupons to redeemed coupons – for the RDS process was 42.5%. The recruitment process 
was successful in identifying respondents that could not have been accessed through the 
traditional channels of treatment centres and arrest-data. In the current dataset, there are 178 
individuals – ie. (53 %) - that had not previously sought treatment or been arrested. 
One limitation was that the incentive to participate and recruit was not large enough to 
encourage middle- to high-income respondents. Seeding respondents from these population 
groups was also difficult due to scepticism about anonymity, and a lack of interest (Burnhams 
et al., 2016).  
The recruitment chains developed from the initial seed respondents are shown in figure 1. 
This diagram shows that there were two were highly productive seeds, while another two did 
not recruit any further respondents (not shown). In Greenpoint and Khayelitsha, recruitment 



















Black African  
Indian  
White  
Seeds Gender Race 
A Male Coloured 
B Male Coloured 
C Female Coloured 
D Female Coloured 
F Female Coloured 
G Female  Coloured 
H Male Coloured 
J Male Black 
African 
K Male Black 
African 





4.3. Descriptive analysis 
The three sites, from which respondents were sampled, were chosen because of their socio-
economic and ethnic dissimilarities, providing a relatively representative sample of all the 
various social groupings in the Western Cape region. The recruitment dynamics between the 
three sites show that these sites are also socially distinct. As shown in table 1 below, 
respondents typically do not recruit from outside of their local regional context.  
Table 1 Respondents’ recruitment patterns between sites2 
 Recruited from  
Respondent’s location Delft Greenpoint Khayelitsha Total 
Delft 119 0 0 119 
Greenpoint 31 71 0 102 
Khayelitsha 0 0 104 104 
Total 150 71 104 325 
 
Greenpoint is the only anomaly to the intra-regional recruitment observed by the recruitment 
patterns across the various sites and appears to have some network links to Delft. The table 
shows that 31 respondents from Greenpoint were recruited by participants in Delft. The 
recruitment behaviour shows that the social networks of the recruits do not typically extend 
across regional boundaries, except in the case of Greenpoint and Delft.  
The extent of drug use across the sites is reflected in the external drug-related arrest data from 
the South African Police, shown in table 2 (South African Police Services, 2016). 
Table 2 Drug-related arrests per station in the Western Cape for 2015/2016 





arrests as a 
percentage of 
all arrests by 
station 
Delft  3 035 34.14% 
Seapoint (serves Greenpoint) 798 18.54% 
Khayelitsha  827 10.54% 
                                                          




The number of drug-related arrests is highest in Delft. While it may appear that drug use may 
be higher or more problematic in this area, such an inference simply from arrest data is 
difficult due to the cross-regional movement of individuals between station territories, the 
extent of police activity and a bias associated with the observability of substance users which 
is reflected in arrest datasets. For example, Caulkins (2007) warns that observations in arrest 
data may reflect a higher proportion of individuals partaking in ‘risky’ transactions such as 
those outdoors with street merchants rather than a reflection of actual sale and consumption. 
Therefore, while the number of arrests in Delft is far higher than that of the other areas, there 
is insufficient evidence to conclude that this is indicative of an increased prevalence of drugs.  
Taking a closer look at the demographic and socio-economic makeup of each of the sample 
regions, it is clear from a cross-tab of race and site that race is closely associated with region.  
Table 3 Number of respondents per race category at each site 
SITE Race  
 Coloured African Other Frequency 
Delft 109 (86.5%) 16 (12.7%) 1 (0.8%) 126 
Greenpoint 77 (74.8%) 20 (19.4%) 6 (5.8%) 103 
Khayelitsha 2 (1.9%) 106 (98.1%) 0 (0.0%) 108 
As a result of the historical system of apartheid, there are observed racial clusters within 
regions in South Africa. It is clear from table 3 that each region tends to be almost 
homogeneous with respect to race, except for Greenpoint, which has greater variation in its 
race profile. The ‘other’ category includes Caucasian individuals and foreigners; these 
individuals are clearly underrepresented in the sample. None of the respondents identified 
themselves as being ‘Indian’. African individuals are also underrepresented in the sample 
from Delft; according to national population estimates, 46.2% of Delft residents are Black 
African (Burnhams et al., 2016). 
Females constitute 35.9% of the sample, which is a higher proportion than reported in other 
studies. Treatment data for South Africa in 2006 showed women that made up 19.1% of all 
admissions into treatment centres (SACENDU, 2006). When disaggregated per drug type, 
females continue to be less likely to use substances. The ratio of male to female drug users is 
10:1 for cannabis; 5:1 for mandrax/sedatives; and 3:1 for amphetamines/club drugs (Peltzer et 




The mean monthly income is R746.11 (approximately US$48.33). The range of income (R0 – 
R 10 000 per month) indicates a sample of low-income earners relative to the broader 
population of South Africa. As previously discussed, the incentive structure of the data 
sampling process largely excludes wealthier individuals from the final sample. It is evident 
that respondents have very little disposable income each month and, therefore, it is probable 
that economic decisions for these individuals become exceedingly important due to the 
constraints of scarcity (Banerjee and Duflo, 2007). This sample also precludes any significant 
influence of substance distribution via the internet.  
The level of income which identifies an individual as being in poverty is a contentious issue 
and a range of estimates have been put forward. The most recent calculation of the poverty 
line for South Africa is R1 319 (Budlender et al., 2015), which is determined by calculating 
the money needed to meet minimum daily energy requirements over a month. This figure of 
basic subsistence living is far higher than the mean income level of the sample and classifies 
85.4% of the sample as being ‘poor’ according to this definition. There is a clear exclusion of 
wealthy individuals who use drugs in the current data.  
The proportion of employed individuals within the sample is 44%; this includes self-
employment and part-time employment. The remaining 56%, with no form of employment, 
rely on other sources of income for survival, such as support from friends and family, income 
from illegal sources, grant receipts, and money from ad hoc jobs and begging, also known as 
‘skarrel’. 
Within the sample, 62% of the individuals are likely to be highly addicted substance users. 
This is determined using the CAGE statements included in the questionnaire. The CAGE tool 
is a very simple and useful tool for a quick indication of substance addiction (O’Brien, 2008; 
Ewing, 1984). Respondents were asked the following questions, adapted from the CAGE 
tool:  
(1) Have you ever felt you should cut down on your substance use? 
(2) Do you get irritated (annoyed) when people speak badly about your drug use?  
(3) Have you ever felt bad or guilty about your substance use? 
(4) Have you ever engaged in substance first thing in the morning to steady your 




The respondents were able to answer ‘always’, ‘sometimes’ or ‘never’ to the CAGE 
statements. The high addiction variable considers an affirmative answer to be ‘always’. It is 
generally accepted that a positive response to two or more of these questions is an indication 
of a potentially problematic substance-user (Ewing, 1984). Therefore, the variable for a high 
intensity of use indicates that respondents answered in the affirmative for two or more of the 
statements.  
The bulk of the survey questions related to their use of and access to methamphetamine, 
heroin, cocaine, ecstasy, methaqualone and methcathinone (‘CAT’). Observing the 
percentage use of each drug across the three sites indicates that there are differences in either 
drug preference or availability between the sites. Methamphetamine, marijuana and 
methaqualone are the most widely used drugs among the sample of respondents, with 
methamphetamine being most popular. Heroin had been used by respondents from Delft and 
Greenpoint, but very few individuals from Khayelitsha reported having used heroin in their 
lifetime. Cocaine, CAT and MDMA/Ecstasy are not widely used by the sample. Table 4 
describes the number of users reporting to have ‘ever used’ each of the substances studied. 
All respondents are poly-drug users, therefore the table below presents multiple response 
items. 
Table 4 Reported percentage of individuals that had ‘ever used’ each substance across the three study 
sites 
Substance Delft Greenpoint Khayelitsha All sites 
 Proportion of users (%) 
Methamphetamine 98.4 96.1 96.3 97.0 
     
Marijuana  97.6 94.2 97.2 96.4 
     
Methaqualone 86.5 83.5 97.2 89.0 
     
Alcohol 90.5 78.6 92.6 87.5 
     
Opioids 38.9 51.5 1.9 30.9 
     
Methcathinone 3.2 6.8 1.9 3.9 
     
MDMA/Ecstasy 28.6 22.5 5.6 19.3 
     




Due to the low prevalence of the use of ecstasy, methcathinone (CAT) and cocaine the 
resulting sample size of users of these drugs is insufficient. They have, therefore, been 
excluded from the analysis. The study excludes marijuana because – though it is widely used 
in South Africa, and commonly used amongst respondents – the wide range of plant varieties, 
minimal processing requirements before sale, local production and growing, and variation in 
purity make it difficult to accurately compare prices (Howell et al., 2015; UNODC, 2010).  
4.4. Respondents’ drug career pathway 
Details on the age at which each respondent began using each of the eight substance types is 
used to map the average pathway of substance initiation. The gateway hypothesis is 
frequently discussed in the literature and is a popular way of thinking about the trajectory of 
drug usage (Kandel, 1992). As previously noted, the hypothesised pathway is for users to 
begin their substance careers with the use of alcohol and cigarettes, progressing to 
psychostimulants with negligible medical implications (referred to as ‘soft’ drugs), and 
finally initiating the use of heavier drugs (referred to as ‘hard’ drugs) and the abuse of 
medically-prescribed drugs.  
Table 5 reflects the mean age of drug-initiation disaggregated by drug-type and region. From 
the totals column, it is apparent that alcohol has the lowest age of initiation, but is very close 
to that of marijuana. Methaqualone appears to be the drug which respondents used next. This 
transition is likely since marijuana and methaqualone are often sold and used together, 
therefore individuals would fluidly transition to using methaqualone if marijuana was already 
being consumed. If we continue to follow the trajectory given by following the average age 




Table 5 Mean and median age of respondents when they first used each of the substance varieties 
surveyed, disaggregated by site 
Substance  Site Total 
  Delft Greenpoint Khayelitsha  
Alcohol Mean 16.1 16.6 15.8 16.1 
 Median 16.0 16.0 16.0 16.0 
 Std. dev. 5.0 3.9 3.9 4.4 
Marijuana Mean 16.6 16.8 15.2 16.2 
 Median 16.0 16.0 15.0 16.0 
 Std. dev. 5.4 5.5 2.7 4.7 
Heroin Mean 24.4 23.9 23 24.2 
 Median 23.0 22.0 23.0 23.0 
 Std. dev. 7.1 9.1 7.1 8.1 
Methaqualone  Mean 19.4 20.3 17.8 19.1 
 Median 18.0 18.0 17.0 18.0 
 Std. dev. 5.9 6.3 3.4 5.4 
Methamphetamine Mean 22.7 25.0 20.3 22.6 
 Median 20.0 23.0 18.0 20.0 
 Std. dev. 8.2 9.3 6.0 8.2 
 
While this is consistent, on average, with the gateway effect, there are many anomalies within 
the sample. A mapping of the transition from a respondent’s initial substance (or substance 
set) to the subsequent substance used is shown in the following matrix (table 6). This matrix 
shows that, while the average trajectory is aligned to the ‘gateway hypothesis’ there are a 
number of anomalies within the sample.  
Table 6 maps the trajectory of drug use from users within the study sample. The figures are 
based on a ranking from data on the year in which the respondent included the various 
substances in their consumption portfolio. Substances initiated in the same year are grouped 
into a single category, although it should be noted that they may have been initiated at 
distinct times within that year. Therefore, even though the information is not granular, it is 
able to show a basic trend. The highlighted cells indicate the most common transition from 




Table 6 Transition matrix mapping respondents' first substance used to the second substance used  
 Second substance used 













First substance used        
Alcohol (23%) 0 0.4 0.3 0 0 0.3 0.0 
Marijuana (34%) 0.4 0 0.4 0 0.3 0 0.0 
Hard drugs (10%) 0.5 0.3 0 0.1 0 0 0.1 
Alcohol and 
marijuana (12%) 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0.0 
Alcohol and Hard 
drugs (4%) 
0 0.9 0 0 0 0 0.1 
Marijuana and a 
hard drug (10%) 
0.6 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 
All at once (7%) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.00 
 
Given the first drug of use, on the left hand side, the probability of the sample respondent 
using either alcohol, marijuana, ‘hard’ drugs or a combination of the three is shown within 
the matrix. The majority of drug users in this sample began using marijuana as their first 
substance with 43% of the sample first using marijuana alone, 65% using it alone or with a 
combination of other substances. For the respondents using purely marijuana as their first 
substance, there seems to be an equal number that use alcohol next and hard drugs as their 
second substance initiated. The second most common substance of first use is alcohol, with 
23% of the sample using alcohol only and 46% using alcohol in combination with other 
substances. There does appear to be a higher proportion of individuals following using 
alcohol with using marijuana as opposed to hard drugs. The transition matrix does not 
indicate that the most common drug-pathway trajectory starts with marijuana and transitions 
to mixed proportions of ‘hard’ drug and alcohol use. Alcohol is also commonly used as the 
first substance; in such cases, marijuana is the most common second drug of use. It is not 
common in this sample that ‘hard’ drugs are used as the first substance initiated.  
Also of interest is the trajectory which respondents pursue in the sequence of drugs used once 




Table 7 Transition matrix to map respondents' first ‘hard’ substance used to second ‘hard substance 
used 























0 0.89 0.04 0 0 0.01 




0.68 0 0.14 0 5.3 0      0.13  




0 0 0.18 0 0 0      0.82  
Methaqualone and 
heroin (1%) 
0 0 0 0 0 0   1  
Methamphetamine 
and heroin (1%) 
0.50 0 0 0 0 0      0.50 
All at once (1%) 0 0 0 0 0 0    1  
 
From table 7 it is evident that methaqualone is the most common first ‘hard’ drug used within 
the sample, with 45.4% using methaqualone alone as the first ‘hard’ substance and a further 
13.65% using methaqualone in combination with other drugs as their first plunge into the use 
of ‘hard’ substances. Methamphetamine was the first hard drug used for 33.83% of 
respondents, with an additional 13.65% using methamphetamine in combination with other 
drugs as their first drug. Heroin appears to be the least frequently used as the first drug when 
respondents initiate hard drug use.  
Methamphetamine has been observed to be rapidly increasing in prevalence in the Western 
Cape region over the past two decades, superseding methaqualone as the most popular 
psychostimulant substance used (Watt, 2014). The frequency of methaqualone being used as 
the first substance, as observed in table 7, may be due to a larger proportion of respondents 
being born in a period where methamphetamine was not widely available. This is described 




Table 8  First ‘hard’ drug used disaggregated over birth years 
Year of 


















% % % % % % % 
1990-1999 
(n=91) 25.9 48.2 1.8 20.5 0.9 0.9 1.8 
1980-1989 
(n=132) 48.6 30.3 7.7 12 0 0.7 0.7 
1970-1979 
(n=57) 59.3 25.4 6.8 6.8 1.7 0 0 
Prior to 
1969 (n=24) 83.3 8.3 8.3 0 0 0 0 
Total 45.4 33.8 5.6 13.1 0.6 0.6 0.9 
 
The sub-group of respondents born after 1990 accessed methamphetamine as their first ‘hard’ 
substance used. However, these respondents constitute only 30% of the sample. Respondents 
born before 1990 typically used methaqualone first and subsequently included 
methamphetamine and heroin in the portfolio of substances consumed. These respondents 
make up the largest proportion of the sample, therefore the overall average first ‘hard’ 
substance is observed to be methaqualone.  
Heroin is not frequently used first by participants, as shown in table 8, and this is partly 
because fewer survey participants were heroin users, but also may be a result of access or 
price. Globally, opium cultivation was drastically cut in 2001, but has since rebounded 
dramatically at an estimated 229% higher potential production than pre-2001 levels 
(UNODC, 2014). However, heroin appears to be declining in its frequency as the first 
substance used amidst increasing heroin prevalence (UNODC, 2014; Pasche and Myers, 
2012). The potential explanation for this inconsistency is that, while heroin prevalence may 
be increasing, methamphetamine tends to crowd out heroin out as the first ‘hard’ substance 
used. Furthermore, existing research is based on treatment data which may contain significant 
bias in the types of primary drugs such studies would typically observe. Substance users are 
likely to seek treatment at the point of ‘problematic’ drug use. Heroin, being a drug 
associated with a likelihood of overdose and other health implications (UNODC, 2010) is 
likely to induce treatment-seeking behaviour far more easily than methamphetamine. In 
addition, other studies show that the majority of heroin users in treatment centres are 
Caucasian (Peltzer et al., 2010) – a population segment that was not prominent in this study. 




5. Assumptions and limitations  
Due to the nature of data on illegal substances generally, there will inevitably be some 
‘messiness’ in the data used for this study. This does not mean that valuable conclusions 
cannot be made from the data, but rather that one should proceed cautiously, using robust 
methods when making conclusions with noisy data (Caulkins, 2006).   
The RDS sampling process mitigates much of the homophily bias, relative to other chain 
referral methods currently available. There was a reported degree of scepticism among 
respondents as to the anonymity of the research, resulting in non-participation of groups of 
individuals. In particular females, Caucasians and individuals of a high economic status are 
underrepresented by the sample. The geographic locations sampled from influence this result 
as only Greenpoint has a significant Caucasian population and significant proportion of 
individuals with a high economic status. The sample consists largely of poor, street-dwelling 
individuals, which is likely to be a result of the value of the incentive not being sufficient to 
attract participation from individuals who have a higher opportunity cost for their time. 
Attempts were made to seed individuals of a higher economic status, but, because of 
scepticism, this was not successfully achieved (Burnhams et al., 2016).  
As this is a pilot dataset, the sample is relatively small, as only 100 respondents were targeted 
from each site, with the final sample being slightly more than the target at 337 respondents. 
Sample size impacts the level of accuracy of the econometric analysis, especially in the case 
where the asymptotic properties of estimators are required to relax the assumption of 
normally distributed errors in regression modelling. Small sample sizes are problematic when 
analysing less popular drugs such as cocaine, MDMA/Ecstasy and methcathinone; for this 
reason, these substances were excluded from the current research.  
The lack of particular data points makes an economic analysis of the dataset challenging. The 
most limiting of these is a question relating to the amount of drugs consumed over any 
particular period of time in order to estimate demand, which could be used to calculate 
various elasticities for the sample population. Furthermore, there appeared to be some 
confusion when reporting prices as to the quantity being reported on, resulting in the 
exclusion of some data points.  
Cross-sectional datasets – such as the one used for this research – are limited in that dynamic 




accounting for unobserved heterogeneity within the dataset using fixed effects estimation or a 
difference-in-difference approach.   
The data are also geographically limited to the Western Cape region of South Africa. Since 
drug availability differs across South Africa, and because of intra-country socio-economic 




6. Theoretical framework 
The following section introduces the framework upon which the data collected on poly-
substance users in the Western Cape is analysed. This data is useful for identifying 
differences paid by different individuals for the same drug in the same region. One-on-one 
transactions enable factors such as the ability to negotiate, the social capital held, trust and 
loyalty to influence the sale and final price. It is expected that prices may fluctuate according 
to who is purchasing the illicit substance in question and, therefore, that certain patterns 
exists in the price paid for drugs and the observable characteristics and/or situation of the 
purchaser.  
Similar to the approach used by Lahaie et al. (2015), a model is formulated where personal 
demographic and economic variables relating to the consumers of psychostimulants are tested 
in order to identify non-zero effects on the price that the consumer paid for their last 
purchase.  
(3) 𝑃𝑖 = 𝑃 + 𝛽
′𝑋 +   𝜀𝑖  
The set of negotiated prices (𝑃𝑖) is expressed as the overall market price (𝑃) – assumed to be 
constant for all respondents - and a matrix of observable characteristics (𝑋) that directly or 
indirectly affect the final price paid for a particular drug. The size and direction of the 
influence of each row in (𝑋) is contained in vector(𝛽). The error term (𝜀𝑖) indicates the effect 
on the final purchase price of unobserved characteristics or external factors. The variables 
contained in 𝑋 include gender, age, intensity of use, site, whether the substance was 
purchased in a public area, whether the substance was purchased from a known dealer, 
employment status, perceived purity of the substance, and the main source of income of the 
individual purchasing the drugs. Since purity is both unobservable by the consumer and the 
researcher, it is not included in the model since consumers (and occasionally dealers) cannot 
include this factor in their negotiation process. The dealers’ portrayal of purity to the 
consumer results in a perception of purity which the consumer can factor in to their decision-
making process. Therefore, a variable indicating perceived purity is included rather than 
actual purity.  
The model is tested by estimating a multivariate ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
using the dataset introduced in section 4.The data are weighted using the RDS II (Volz-




7. Results and discussion 
The data was analysed in multiple stages with increasing complexity and depth of insight. 
This section begins with estimated population proportions of various sub-populations within 
the poly-substance using population of the three sites in the Western Cape. Subsequent to 
this, average prices paid by individuals from each sub-population are estimated for each site. 
This bivariate analysis gives some insights into the differences paid by various sub-
populations. This is further tested in a multivariate analysis of the log of substance price 
against various demographic, geographic and economic variables.  
7.1. Population estimates 
The technique of estimating population proportions from an RDS sample is a relatively new 
method and the most comprehensive discussion on the topic for use with STATA is currently 
available from Schonlau and Liebau (2012). This approach is used to mitigate the extent of 
homophily and network-size bias within the recruitment behaviour. The idea behind this is 
that individuals with larger network sizes are more likely to be observed within the sample. 
Secondly, it is also assumed that individuals recruit those similar to themselves. The original 
RDS estimators adjust for both of these sources of bias.  
Another commonly used estimator in RDS datasets is the Volz-Heckathorn or RDS II 
estimator (Schonlau and Liebau, 2012; Volz and Heckathorn, 2008). This estimator adjusts 
for network-size bias by weighting each observation by the inverse of its reported network 
size, but does not calculate or adjust for the effect of homophily bias. This estimator is more 
appropriate for continuous data where selection within sub-population groups is not pertinent.  
Bootstrap standard errors (BSE) used for estimating the population proportions are preferable 
for both RDS I and II estimators (Schonlau and Liebau, 2012). For this reason, only BSE are 
shown in table 9.  
The variables presented below are, in and of themselves, valuable in determining the makeup 
of the drug-using population in the Western Cape region. The variables may also have some 
influence on the final price paid for a particular drug; this is discussed in greater detail in the 




Table 9 RDS I and RDS II estimates of population proportions of a selection of sub-populations 
  RDS I RDS II (Volz-Heckathorn) 




BSE 95% CI Population 
prop. 
BSE 95% CI  
Race          
Coloured 0.56 0.61 0.07 0.47 0.75 0.57 0.05  0.47 0.67 
Black African 0.42 0.38 0.07 0.23 0.52 0.42 0.05 0.31 0.52 
Other 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.03 
Gender          
Female 0.36 0.45 0.06 0.34 0.56 0.46 0.05 0.35 0.55 
Male 0.64 0.55 0.06 0.44 0.66 0.54 0.05 0.45 0.65 
Addiction Level          
Low 0.62 0.68 0.05 0.59 0.77 0.68 .04 0.59 0.77 
High 0.38 0.32 0.05 0.23 0.41 0.32 .04 0.23 0.41 
Employment status          
Employed 0.44 0.42 0.05 0.32 0.52 0.41 0.05 0.32 0.51 
Unemployed 0.56 0.58 0.05 0.48 0.68 0.59 0.05 0.49 0.68 
Source of income          
Friend/family  
0.13 0.13 0.04 0.05     0.22 0.15 0.05 0.04 0.23 
Employment 
0.54 0.52 0.07 0.41 0.63 0.52 0.05 0.41 0.63 
Illegal source 
0.10 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.12 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.11 
Grants 
0.07 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.16 0.10 0.04 0.03 0.18 
Handouts/ad hoc 
0.17 0.18 0.04 0.10 0.26 0.17 0.04 0.09 0.24 
The results of the RDS I for estimating the population proportions of each race group, 
showed a high degree of homophily. This indicates a potential undersampling of the Coloured 
sub-population and oversampling of Black African individuals. However, as discussed 
previously, the three sites have differing proportions of the racial sub-populations. For 
example, Khayelitsha residents are predominantly Black African. Therefore, the high level of 




The population proportion of female psychostimulant users in the Western Cape regions is 
estimated to be higher than the sample proportion of female drug-users. This is to be expected 
since drug usage by females is still taboo in most communities and as such female users 
would not be as willing to come forward and reveal information about their drug-use 
behaviour (Burnhams et al., 2016; Kimani et al., 2014). However, it is important to balance 
this information with the notion that the estimated under-representation is actually an 
accurate reflection of the gender proportions. Treatment data for South Africa in 2006 
indicate that women made up 19.1% of all admissions into treatment centres (Peltzer et al., 
2010) and men have been observed to be 8-9 times more likely to use illicit substances than 
females (Van Heerden, 2009). 
There is an estimated over-representation of highly addicted users. Respondents would have 
tended to recruit individuals who are heavy drug users because of the eligibility requirements 
of the study; therefore, the extent of heavy usage is slightly over-estimated by the sample 
proportion.  
7.2. Distribution of price data  
The mean, median and mode price paid by respondents, per quantity, for each of the three 
focal substances is reflected in table 10. Methamphetamine and heroin are generally sold in 
‘bankies’. There may be differing quantities within each ‘bankie’; however, it is usually 1g or 
a single-use quantity (roughly 0.25g or less). Methamphetamine is also commonly sold in 
‘straws’. This is, as the name would suggest, a drinking straw filled with the substance which 




Table 10 Descriptive statistics of the aggregated price of methaqualone, heroin and methamphetamine 
from three regions of the Western Cape arranged in price order 
 N Mean Median Mode SD Min  Max 
Purchase of single-serving quantity 
Price of methaqualone  
(single use, half-tablet) 
84 25.45 25 30 4.49 20 32 
Price of heroin  
(single use, bankie) 
42 27.17 30 30 4.64 20 40 
Price of methamphetamine  
(single use, straw) 
113 29.09 30 30 8.65 15 60 
Price of methamphetamine 
(single use, bankie) 
252 34.39 30 30 12.42 10 100 
Purchase of larger quantity  
Price of methaqualone  
(full tablet)  
73 49.52 50 60a 8.95 30 60 
Price of methamphetamine  
(per gram, bankie)  
26 181.54 165 Multi-
modalb 
73.52 80 400 
aThere are 26 observations at a price of R60 and 25 at R40, this is closer to a bi-modal distribution. 
b The modal price categories contain three observations each and are: R120; R150; R160; R180 and R200 
The average point-in-time prices of methamphetamine, methaqualone and heroin shown 
above are organised according to the affordability of a single use, with the exception of the 
final two rows which represent purchases of higher quantities. Current studies of drug use in 
the region observe that methamphetamine is becoming increasingly popular and that, 
currently, it is the most widely used drug after cannabis (Hobkirk et al., 2015). The popularity 
of methamphetamine in the current sample, as well as in previous research, does not appear 
to be a result of a lower single-serving price. Hobkirk et al. (2015) describe the reported 
reasoning for methamphetamine popularity, as the nature of the high which gives the feeling 
of an “ability to do anything you want to” (pp. 101), as well as pressure to conform to social 
trends.   
The median and mode for a single serving of each substance is R30,00, with the exception of 
the median methaqualone half-tablet price. The mean for all substances, aside from a 
methamphetamine ‘bankie’, is lower – indicating that some consumers were able to obtain 
their goods for less than the centralised ‘going rate’. The average methamphetamine price is 
positively skewed, indicating the existence of influential observations at a price higher than 
the ‘going rate’.  
The mean prices observed above indicate some level of price variation within each particular 




in multiples of five. This is consistent with the findings of Caulkins and Reuter (2010), as 
well as those of Wendel and Curtis (2000). It is suggested that the reason for this 
phenomenon is the necessity of completing transactions quickly. Dealers will typically adjust 
the quantity sold through drug ‘cutting’ before adjusting the price. 
7.3. Price differentials by population group and region 
The prices observed in the sample tend to differ significantly across respondents. 
Geographical variations are to be expected, in accordance with Caulkins (2006). However, 
Lahaie et al. (2015) illustrate how price differentials within a single geographic area may also 
occur. Price differentials observed by consumers of methamphetamine, methaqualone and 
heroin are independently shown and discussed in the sections below using a bivariate analysis 
of the continuous price data and discrete categorical data. The difference in the price paid by 
each sub-population group is central to this section. The differences are tested using a two-
sample t statistic when two sub-population groups are compared. In the case of multiple sub-
populations, an ANOVA test is performed to determine whether the means of two or more 
sub-populations differ, by comparing the variation between sub-population groups to the 
variation within each sub-population group. The corresponding p-values resulting from the 
tests for mean equivalence are shown in each table.  
7.3.1. Methamphetamine 
Methamphetamine use has been on the rise in the Western Cape over the past two decades 
with increasing numbers of users being admitted to treatment facilities (Hobkirk et al., 2015). 
Of the respondents from Delft, Greenpoint and Khayelitsha, 94%; 90% and 95%,  
respectively, reported using methamphetamine in the month prior to participation in the 
study. Overall, 97% of the poly-drug-using sample reported to have tried methamphetamine 
at some point in their lives, and 93% had used the substance in the previous month.  
Table 11 Descriptive statistics for the price of a single-serving methamphetamine ‘bankie’ at each site 
Site 




1. Delft (n=107) 31.92 30 30 12.51 15 100 
2. Greenpoint (n=51) 34.80 30 20 16.15 20 100 
3. Khayelitsha (n=94) 36.99 32.5 30 9.16 10 60 
Total (n=252) 34.39 30 30 12.42 10 100 





The average and median price of methamphetamine for a single-serving methamphetamine 
‘bankie’, shown in table 11, is highest in Khayelitsha and, on average, lowest in Delft. At 
least two sites have significantly different mean methamphetamine prices. The price data are 
slightly positively skewed, indicating that the mean is somewhat influenced by transactions at 
a price higher than the common ‘going rate’. This may be indicative of the concealed actual 
quantity and quality of substances purchased (eg. the ability of dealers to ‘cut’ the drugs), or 
the ability of dealers to charge inflated prices to certain customers. However, there may be 
conflating factors, such as increased price due to purity levels, premiums for credit, or 
discounts for holding social capital.   
Table 12 shows an analysis of the methamphetamine price across sub-population groups for 
all sites, while table 13 disaggregates the price data by site. The sub-population categories 
were determined by identifying the potential observable characteristics that may have an 
influence on price. Level of education was considered but not included because the available 
information on educational attainment lacked granular detail. Language spoken is also not 
included because of the high correlation between this variable and the variables indicating 




Table 12 Descriptive analysis of the price of a ‘per use’ methamphetamine ‘bankie’ across 
sub-population groups 
Sub-population group N Mean Median SD 
Gender Male  155 36.3 30.0 11.7 
Female 97 31.4 30.0 13.0 
 Total 252 34.4 30.0 12.4 
 (p-value)  0.00   
      
Employment status Unemployed  158 33.8 30.0 11.2 
Employed  94 35.5 30.0 14.2 
 Total 252 34.4 30.0 12.4 
 (p-value)  0.29  
       
Location of purchase Private 209 34.4 30.0 11.7 
Public 39 32.2 30.0 12.2 
 Total 248 34.1 30.0 11.8 
 (p-value)  0.27  
       
Perceived purity Low 165 33.3 30.0 12.3 
High 87 35.3 30.0 12.5 
 Total 252 34.3 30.0 12.4 
 (p-value)  0.06  
 
 
     
Dealer offers sales on credit No 174 34.2 30.0 11.9 
Yes 78 34.9 30.0 13.5 
 Total 252 34.4 30.0 12.4 
 (p-value)  0.68  
  
     
Intensity of use Low  160 33.8 30.0 9.7 
High 92 35.4 30.0 16.2 
 Total 252 34.4 30.0 12.4 






Income source Family and friends 32 38.6 30.0 17 
Employment 116 35.3 30.0 11.3 
Illegal sources 16 33.4 30.0 19.4 
Social support  16 32.2 30.0 9.3 
Handouts 35 33.9 30.0 12.2 
 Total  215 35.2 30.0 13 
 (p-value)  0.28   
      
Race Coloured  135 32.8 30.0 13.2 
African  115 36.5 30.0 11.2 
Other 2 22.5 22.5 3.5 
 Total  252 34.4 30.0 12.4 
 (p-value)  0.03  




Table 13 Descriptive statistics of the price of a ‘per use’ methamphetamine ‘bankie’ across sub-population groups, disaggregated 
by site 
 Site 
 Delft (n=107)  Greenpoint (n=51)  Khayelitsha (n=94) 
Sub-population group N Mean Med. SD  N Mean Med. SD  N Mean Med. SD 
Gender Male  48 34.7 30.0 14.1  24 35.6 35.0 13.2  83 37.4 37.5 9.5 
Female 59 29.7 30.0 10.6  27 34.1 25.0 18.6  11 34.1 30.0 5.8 
 Total 107 31.9 30.0 12.5  51 34.8 30.0 16.2  94 37.0 32.5 9.2 
 (p-value)  0.04     0.73     0.27   
                
Employment 
status 
Unemployed  68 31.2 30.0 11.8  23 30.0 25.0 12  67 37.6 40.0 9.1 
Employed  39 33.2 30.0 13.6  28 38.8 40.0 18.2  27 35.4 30.0 9.4 
 Total 107 31.9 30.0 12.5  51 34.8 30.0 16.2  94 37.0 32.5 9.2 
 (p-value)  0.42  
 
  0.05  
 
  0.28  
 
                
Location of 
purchase 
Private 104 32.0 30.0 13.9  17 37.6 40.0 13.8  88 36.7 30.0 9.3 
Public 2 30.0    30.0 -  33 31.4 25.0 12.8  4 40.0 40.0 8.2 
 Total 107 31.9 30.0 13.6  50 33.5 30.0 16.6  94 36.9 30.0 9.2 
 (p-value)  0.83  
 
  0.11  
 
  0.49  
 
                
Perceived 
purity 
Low 86 32.2 30.0 14.5  34 30.6 25.0 13.1  45 37.6 40.0 8.3 
High 21 31.0 30.0 9.2  17 43.2 40.0 18.6  49 36.4 30.0 9.9 
 Total 107 31.9 30.0 13.6  51 34.8 30.0 16.6  94 37.0 32.5 9.2 
 (p-value)  0.70  
 
  0.00  
 
  0.53  
 
                
Dealer offers  
credit 
No  68 31.2 30.0 11.1  32 34.8 30.0 17.4  74 36.7 30.0 9.0 
Yes 39 33.2 30.0 14.7  19 34.7 40.0 14.2  20 38.3 40.0 10.0 
 Total 107 31.9 30.0 12.5  51 34.8 30.0 16.2  94 37.0 32.5 9.2 
 (p-value)  0.42  
 
  0.98  
 
  0.49  
                 
Intensity of 
use 
Low 72 29.9 30.0 7.3  19 35.5 40.0 12.8  69 37.5 30.0 9.5 
High 35 36.0 30.0 18.7  32 34.4 27.5 18  25 35.7 40.0 8.3 
 Total 107 31.9 30.0 12.5  51 34.8 30.0 16.2  94 37.0 32.5 9.2 
 (p-value)  0.02  
 
  0.81  
 
  0.41  




friends 17 35.6 30.0 16.7 
 
4 57.5 45.0 28.7 
 
11 36.4 40.0 6.4 
Employment 38 31.2 30.0 11.1  27 37 40.0 13.7  51 37.4 40.0 9.4 
Illegal sources 3 50.0 30.0 43.6  7 26.4 25.0 7.5  6 33.3 30.0 8.2 
Social support 14 30.7 30.0 9.0  - - - -  2 42.5 42.5 3.5 
Handouts 4 35.0 30.0 10.0  12 27.9 20.0 13.4  19 37.4 30.0 10.8 
 Total 76 33.0 30.0 14.3  50 35 30.0 16.3  89 37.1 35.0 9.2 
 (p-value)  0.73     0.03     0.31   
                
Race Coloured 94 32.4 30.0 13.2  39 33.5 30.0 13.7  2 37.5 37.5 3.5 
 African 13 28.5 30.0 4.3  10 42.5 40.0 23.5  92 37.0 30.0   9.3 
 Other - - - -  2 22.5 22.5 3.5  - - - - 
 Total 107 31.9 30.0 12.5  51 34.8 30.0 16.2  98 37.0 32.5 9.2 
 (p-value)  0.29  
 
  0.49  
 





Table 12 shows the price paid for methamphetamine for each sub-population, aggregated 
across all sites. This representation identifies where potential patterns in the transaction price 
for methamphetamine may exist. Table 13 indicates potential structural dissimilarities in the 
way dealers transact deals with various client sub-populations on each of the three sites.  
There are three types of variables: those describing the product, those describing the 
customer, and the purchasing process itself. In licit markets, price is to a large extent 
dependent on the quality of a product. A similar trend would be expected between price and 
quality (or in the case of psychostimulant substances, purity) in illicit markets. In the 
methamphetamine market in Greenpoint, a higher perceived purity is associated with a higher 
selling price. However, in Delft and Khayelitsha there is no significant price distinction 
across perceived levels of purity. This may indicate higher uncertainty around purity in these 
two sites.  
For variables describing the customer, the aggregated analysis shows that there is a 
significant difference in the prices paid for methamphetamine across the two gender sub-
populations. On average, females in the sample reported lower prices than their male 
counterparts. This is a consistent observation across all sites; however, it is only significantly 
so in Delft. Potential reasons for this observation may include the possession of social capital 
held by women in the illicit substance (from Figure 1 it is observed that female seeds have 
extensive networks within their local substance-using communities) or in-kind payments or 
bartering using prostitution or sexual favours.  
Prices also tend to differ significantly across the sub-populations defined by race for the 
aggregated data across all sites. The Coloured sub-population reported a discounted average 
price for methamphetamine compared to the Black African sub-population. The category 
indicating ‘other’ race, while significantly discounted, only contained two observations, 
discrediting the significance of this discount. As these two observations were included in the 
ANOVA, a t test was also performed to test whether the conclusion that at least two means 
differ was a result of this inclusion. The p-value from the t test comparing the mean price 
paid by Black African and Coloured sub-populations indicates a significant dissimilarity at a 
2% level of confidence. However, as can be seen from the introductory discussion of the data, 
race is highly correlated to site. Therefore, some of the dissimilarity may be on account of the 




Indeed, table 13 shows that there are only a few observations for certain race sub-populations. 
Furthermore, the differences in means across race groups lose significance once the data are 
disaggregated by site.  
The observed variation in price patterns supports the hypothesis that methamphetamine 
markets in each region operate in distinct ways, and that this distinction may not be fully 
accounted for simply by including a categorical variable indicating region in a multivariate 
regression model. Separate estimation by site may be required.   
7.3.2. Methaqualone (Mandrax) 
Methaqualone, a drug sold in tablet form, is used by 89% of the respondents across all three 
sites. However, price data are only available for Delft and Greenpoint. Only two price 
observations exist for Khayelitsha, making the sample size too small for any useful inference. 
Table 14 shows the average price of a half-tablet of methaqualone for each site.  
Table 14 Descriptive statistics for the price of a per-serving methamphetamine ‘bankie’ across all 
sites 
Site 




1. Delft (n=34) 21.85 20.00 20.00 2.30 20 25 
2. Greenpoint (n=48) 28.02 30.00 30.00 3.85 20 32 




All sites (n=84) 25.45 25.00 30.00 4.49 20 32 
(p-value) 0.00      
aThere are only two observations (R20 and R30 ) for Khayelitsha 
From this table it can be seen that the price of a methaqualone half-tablet is lowest in Delft, at 
R21,85 (median: R20,00) and highest in Greenpoint at R 28,02 (median: R30,00). 
Respondents at these two sites reported significantly different methaqualone prices. When 
Khayelitsha is excluded and a two-sample t test is performed on the methaqualone mean price 
across Delft and Greenpoint, dissimilarity with a high level of confidence results. It is also 
apparent that Greenpoint has a greater variation in prices than Delft. The prices reported are 
most frequently R30 per half-tablet in Greenpoint and R20 per half-tablet in Delft.  
Table 15 shows an analysis using the methaqualone price paid across sub-population groups 
for all sites, and table 16 disaggregates the price data by site. The difference in the average 
price paid by each sub-group is tested using either a two-sample ttest or ANOVA (for 




Table 15 Descriptive analysis of the price of a ‘per use’ methaqualone half-tablet across population groups 
across all sites 
Sub-population group N Mean Median SD 
Gender 
Male  47 25.6 25.0 4.4 
 Female  37 25.2 25.0 4.6 
 
Total  
84 25.5 25.0 4.5 
 (p-value)  0.67   




Employment status Unemployed  37 24.3 25.0 4.3 
Employed  47 26.3 30.0 4.5 
 Total  84 25.5 25.0 4.5 
 (p-value)  0.04   
      
Location of purchase Private  67 24.7 25.0 4.3 
Public  17 28.4 30.0 4.0 
 Total   25.5 25.0 4.5 
 (p-value)  0.00   
    
 
 
Purity Low  58 25.3 25.0 4.5 
 High  26 25.8 27.5 4.6 
 Total  84 25.5 25.0 4.5 
 (p-value)  0.67   
    
 
 
Credit availability Not available  40 25.1 25.0 4.5 
Available  44 25.7 26.5 4.5 
 Total  84 25.5 25.0 4.5 
 (p-value)  0.56   
    
 
 
Intensity of use Low  46 25.6 25.0 4.5 
High 38 25.3 25.0 4.5 
 Total  84 25.5 25.0 4.5 
 (p-value)  0.80   
      
Source of income Friend/family  13 23.6 20.0 4.6 
Employment  40 25.6 25.0 4.6 
Illegal source  11 26.6 30.0 4.5 
Grants  8 22.6 22.0 3.4 
Handouts/odd jobs 
/’skarrel’  
10 27.7 30.0 3.9 
 Total  82 25.4 25.0 4.5 
 (p-value)  0.01   
      
Race Coloured  63 25.0 25.0 4.4 
 Black African  18 27.2 30.0 4.3 
 Other  3 23.3 20.0 5.8 
 
Total  84 25.5 25.0 4.5 





Table 16 Descriptive statistics of the price of a ‘per use’ methaqualone half-tablet across population 
groups disaggregated by site3 
  Site 
  Delft (n=34)  Greenpoint (n=48) 
Sub-population group n Mean Median SD  n Mean Median SD 
Gender Male  15 22.1 20.0 2.5  30 27.4 30.0 4.1 
Female  19 21.6 20.0 2.2  18 29.0 30.0 3.3 
 Total  34 21.9 20.0 2.3  48 28.0 30.0 3.8 













Unemployed  21 21.5 20.0 2.3  15 27.9 30.0 3.6 
Employed  13 22.4 22.0 2.3  33 28.1 30.0 4.0 
 Total  34 21.9 20.0 2.3  48 28.0 30.0 3.8 
 (p-value)  0.30  
 
  0.85  
 
           
Location of 
purchase 
Private  34 21.9 20.0 2.3  31 27.8 30.0 3.8 
Public  0 - - 
 
 17 28.4 30.0 4.0 
 Total  34 21.9 20.0 2.3  48 28 30.0 3.8 













Low  25 21.9 20.0 2.3  31 28.1 30.0 3.8 
High  9 21.7 20.0 2.5  17 27.9 30.0 4.0 
 Total  34 21.9 20.0 2.3  48 28.0 30.0 3.8 
 (p-value)  0.78  
 











Not available  16 21.8 20.0 2.3  23 27.3 30.0 4.3 
Available  18 21.9 20.0 2.3  25 28.7 30.0 3.3 
 Total  34 21.9 20.0 2.3  48 28.0 30.0 3.8 













Low  20 21.9 20.0 2.4  25 28.7 30.0 3.4 
High 14 21.7 20.0 2.3  23 27.3 30.0 4.2 
 Total  34 21.9 20.0 2.3  48 28.0 30.0 3.8 
 (p-value)  0.77     0.22   
           
Source of 
income 
Friend/family 9 21.7 20.0 2.5  4 28.0 30.0 5.4 
Employment  15 22.0 20.0 2.5  23 28.0 30.0 3.9 
Illegal source  1 20.0 20.0 
 
 10 27.3 30.0 4.2 
Grants  7 21.6 22.0 1.8  1 30.0 30.0 - 
Handouts/odd 
jobs /’skarrel’  1 22.0 22.0 -  9 28.3 30.0 3.5 
 Total 33 21.8 20.0 2.3  47 28.0 30.0 3.9 
 (p-value)  0.00     0.58   
           
Race Coloured  31 21.9 20.0 2.3  32 28.1 30.0 3.8 
 Black African  3 21.7 20.0 2.9  13 28.8 30.0 3.1 
 Other 0 - - -  3 23.3 20.0 5.8 
 Total  34 21.9 20.0 2.3  48 28.0 30.0 3.8 
 (p-value)  0.81     0.43   
                                                          




Table 15 shows the analysis of the methaqualone half-tablet price for each sub-population, 
aggregated over all sites. Table 16 disaggregates this over data extracted from Delft and 
Greenpoint. This representation identifies potential patterns in the transaction price for 
methaqualone. However, the variation here is far smaller than that for methamphetamine. 
Respondents typically pay R20 or R 30 for a half-tablet.  
In table 15, the average price paid across three sub-population groups is significantly 
different. Respondents who were employed reported paying higher prices than those who 
were unemployed. Furthermore, when methaqualone was purchased in a public area – such as 
on the street, or in a bar or nightclub – respondents reported that they paid higher prices for 
methaqualone. Lastly, there is a significant difference between prices paid by two or more of 
the sub-groups that is determined by their source of income. Social support recipients pay, on 
average, lower prices for methamphetamine than other respondents.  
As observed in table 14, respondents from Delft pay significantly lower prices than those 
residing in Greenpoint. In Delft, methaqualone mostly sells for R20 and in Greenpoint it 
mostly sells for R30. Differences in the prices at these two sites appear to have influenced the 
observed differences in methaqualone price across sub-populations. For example, a greater 
proportion of employed individuals reside in Greenpoint and this has indirectly influenced the 
observation of a significant premium paid by employed individuals. Being employed or 
unemployed in each of the sites in isolation does not result in a significantly different price 
paid for methaqualone.  
In Delft, there are still significant price dissimilarities across the sub-populations with regard 
to the source of a respondent’s income. For this site, respondents receiving their income from 
illegal activities report paying the lowest prices for methaqualone.  
There is far less variation among the price observations for methaqualone than for 
methamphetamine. However, price differences between Delft and Greenpoint indicate that 
the location where the substance is purchased makes a sizeable difference in the price one 
would be likely to pay.  
7.3.3. Heroin 
Heroin is less prevalent in the sample than both methamphetamine and methaqualone, 




respondents in Delft, 39% admitted to having tried heroin; in Greenpoint, 51% reported 
having tried heroin and only two individuals form Khayelitsha admitted to having tried it. 
Overall, 31% of the sample of poly-substance users had tried heroin before and 22% had used 
the substance in the preceding month. None of the respondents in Khayelitsha had used 
heroin in the preceding month; price and purchasing data were therefore not collected from 
them.   
Table 17 Descriptive statistics for the price of a per-serving heroin ‘bankie’ (approx. 0.25g) for across all sites 
Site Mean Median Mode Standard Deviation (SD) Minimum Maximum 
Delft (n=15) 30.67 30.00 30.00 2.58 30 40 
Greenpoint (n=27) 25.22 25.00 Multi-modala 4.41 20 35 
Total (n=42) 27.17 30.00 30.00 4.65 20 40 
(p-value) 0.00      
a The modal price categories contain eight observations each are: R20; R25 and R30 
The mean price of a ‘per serving’ quantity of heroin is R27,17, with the cheapest price 
observed R10 and the most expensive R40. The most frequently observed price for heroin is 
R30 across both sites and, importantly, Delft only has one observation that is not R30. For 
this reason, it will be difficult to observe price differentials in the Delft sample. Heroin is, on 
average, reported to be significantly cheaper – R25,22 (median R25,00) compared to R30.67 
(median: R30,00) – in Greenpoint than in Delft.  
Table 18 depicts the variation in the heroin price across sub-populations, aggregated over all 
sites. Table 19 shows the variation in the heroin price paid by different sub-populations with 
Greenpoint and Delft separately. There is very little variation in the reported prices in Delft, 
with 93% of respondents paying R30 for a ‘single serving’. The variation across groups is, 




Table 18 Descriptive statistics of the price of a ‘per use’ heroin bankie across sub-population 
groups 
Sub-population group N Mean Median SD 
Gender Male  24 27.0 30.0 5.3 
 Female  18 27.4 30.0 3.6 
 Total  42 27.2 30.0 4.6 
 (p-value)  0.79   
      
Employment status Unemployed  22 27.7 30.0 5.1 
Employed  20 26.6 25.0 4.2 
 Total  42 27.2 30.0 4.6 
 (p-value)  0.41   
 
 
    
Location of purchase Private  18 29.2 30.0 4.1 
Public  24 25.6 25.0 4.5 
 Total 42 27.2 30.0 4.6 
 (p-value)  0.01   
 
 
    
Perceived purity Low  24 27.0 30.0 5.3 
High  18 27.4 30.0 3.6 
 Total  42 27.2 30.0 4.6 
 (p-value)  0.79   
 
 
    
Credit availability Unavailable  21 26.8 30.0 5.2 
Available  21 27.5 30.0 4.2 
 Total  42 27.2 30.0 4.6 
 (p-value)  0.62   
      
Intensity of use Low  15 26.5 30.0 4.6 
High  27 27.5 30.0 4.7 
 Total  42 27.2 30.0 4.6 
 (p-value)  0.52   
 
 
    
Source of income Friends/ family 3 30.0 30.0 0 
Employment 21 27.3 30.0 5.2 
Illegal source  9 28.1 30.0 2.9 
Social support 1 30.0 30.0  
Handouts/ odd jobs/ 
‘skarrel’  7 23.6 20.0 4.8 
 Total  41 30.7 30.0 2.7 
 (p-value)  0.47   
      
Race Coloured  33 27.5 30.0 4.5 
 Black African  6 29.2 30.0 3.8 
 Other  3 20.0 20.0 0 
 Total  42 27.2 30.0 4.6 







Table 19 Descriptive statistics of the price of a single use heroin ‘bankie’ across population groups, 
disaggregated by site4 
  Site 
  Delft (n=15)  Greenpoint (n=27) 
Sub-population group N Mean Med. SD  N Mean Med. SD 
Gender Male  7 31.4 30.0 3.8  17 25.2 25.0 4.9 
 Female  8 30.0 30.0 0  10 25.3 25.0 3.8 
 Total  15 30.7 30.0 2.6  27 25.2 25.0 4.4 
 (p-value)  0.30     0.95  
 
           
Employment 
status 
Unemployed  11 30.9 30.0 3.0  11 24.6 25.0 4.7 
Employed  4 30.0 30.0 0  16 25.7 25.0 4.3 
 Total  15 30.7 30.0 2.6  27 25.2 25.0 4.4 
 (p-value)  0.57     0.52   
 
 






Private  15 30.7 30.0 2.6  3 22.0 23.0 1.7 
Public  - - - -  24 25.6 25.0 4.5 
 Total 15 30.7 30.0 2.6  27 25.2 25.0 4.4 
 (p-value)  -     0.19   
 
 






Low  5 32.0 30.0 4.5  19 25.7 25.0 4.8 
High  10 30.0 30.0 0  8 24.1 25.0 3.2 
 Total  15 30.7 30.0 2.6  27 25.2 25.0 4.4 









Unavailable  7 31.4 30.0 3.8  14 24.5 25.0 4.2 
Available  8 30.0 30.0 0  13 26.0 25.0 4.7 
 Total  15 30.7 30.0 2.6  27 25.2 25.0 4.4 
 (p-value)  0.30     0.39  
 
           
Intensity of 
use 
Low  7 30.0 30.0 0  8 23.5 21.5 4.4 
High  8 31.4 30.0 3.5  19 26.0 25.0 4.3 
 Total  15 30.7 30.0 2.6  27 25.2 25.0 4.4 
 (p-value)  0.37     0.19   
 
 






Friends/ family 3 30.0 30.0 0  - - - - 
Employment 7 31.4 30.0 3.8  14 25.2 25.0 4.6 
Illegal source  3 30.0 30.0 0  6 23.6 27.5 4.8 
Social support 1 30.0 30.0 -  - - - - 
Handouts  - - - -  7 25.2 20.0 4.4 
 Total  14 30.7 30 2.7  27 26.2 25 9.8 
 (p-value)  0.87     0.60   
           
Race Coloured  12 30.8 30.0 2.9  21 25.5 25.0 4.0 
 Black African  3 30 30.0 0  3 28.3 25.0 5.8 
 Other  - - - -  3 20.0 20.0 0 
 Total  15 30.7 30.0 2.6  27 25.2 25.0 4.4 
 (p-value)  0.63     0.15   
                                                          
4 Khayelitsha was not included as only two individuals reported using heroin and it was used more than 30 days prior to the 





The preceding tables (18 and 19) show bivariate analyses of the price of a single serving of 
heroin across sub-populations, with the second table disaggregating the price analysis by site. 
In table 18, it appears that the mean heroin price differs across the variables for location of 
purchase and across race sub-populations.  
It is already known, from table 17, that the price of a single serving of heroin is significantly 
lower in Greenpoint than in Delft. Table 19 shows that purchases are only made in public 
areas in Greenpoint. Therefore, the significance of mean differences between purchasing in 
private areas and in public areas – as observed in table 18 – is largely a result of public 
purchases being observed in Greenpoint where prices are on average lower.  
Differences across sub-population grouping by race are significant at the 10% level in 
Greenpoint. Using Tukey’s method for a pairwise comparison of means, it is clear that the 
significant p-value from the ANOVA is caused by the difference between ‘other’ and the 
Black African and Coloured race categories. Significantly different prices are not observed 
for Black African and Coloured sub-populations. 
Heroin prices appear to be relatively similar in Delft. Once again, the differences between 
sites proved to be highly significant, which resulted in the false appearance of significant 
average price differences across sub-populations. The confounding outcome on final 
purchase price resulting from the array influencing variable is controlled for in the following 
multivariate analyses.  
7.4. Multivariate analysis 
On account of the complexity within the system of buyers and sellers of illicit 
psychostimulant substances, a multivariate regression approach is applied to the dataset. This 
approach is useful in that it allows for the correlation between two variables to be examined 
while holding the remaining system constant. This approach was limited due to non-
responses in the dataset, particularly for methaqualone and heroin use. In the case of heroin, a 
multivariate approach could not be successfully applied.  
7.4.1. Methamphetamine 
An ordinary least squares (OLS) multivariate regression was used to determine the effect of 




at a constant level for analysis. Population weights are included in the estimation to mitigate 
the prevalence of bias due to network size. These estimated weights assist us to predict what 
the sample would have looked like in the absence of differing personal network sizes and 
brings the analysis closer to the true population. The original RDS population weight 
estimator is appropriate for categorical dataset and likelihood models. However, since the 
pricing data are continuous, the RDS II (Volz-Heckathorn) estimator is applied to calculate 
the weights. For comparison, for each of the tables in the following section, an unweighted 
regression can be found in the appendix. Sandwich estimators are used to compute the 
variance-covariance matrix (Spiller, 2009).  
The presence of multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity was tested for and both were found 
to be of negligible significance. The results of the OLS regression analysis of the price of 




Table 20 Multivariate OLS regression showing the associations between individual characteristics 
and methamphetamine retail prices in the Western Cape  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Log (price of methamphetamine, per serving ‘bankie’) 
     
Log (income) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Employed 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.08 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
Highly addicted 0.07 0.07 0.06 -0.05 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) 
Age 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Age squared -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Female -0.20*** -0.20*** -0.21*** -0.25*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) 
High purity 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.01 
 (0.05) (0.05)  (0.06) 
Race (base = Coloured)     
Black African -0.05 -0.05 -0.07 -0.03 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) 
Purchased from same person  0.01 0.00 0.02 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Bought in public   -0.18** -0.18** 
   (0.09) (0.08) 
Source of income (base = 
employment) 
    
Friends & Family    0.36*** 
    (0.07) 
Illegal Source    -0.10 
    (0.08) 
Social support     0.05 
    (0.08) 
Handout    -0.01 
    (0.08) 
Sites (base= Delft)     
Greenpoint 0.02 0.02 0.10 0.23** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) 
Khayelitsha -0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.03 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) 
Constant 3.50*** 3.48*** 3.55*** 3.53*** 
 (0.40) (0.39) (0.38) (0.37) 
     
Observations 243 243 239 209 
R-squared 0.14 0.15 0.18 0.29 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The effect of gender on the price paid for methamphetamine is striking in its magnitude and 
significance in the model. In the final regression, females are estimated to pay 25% less for a 




behaviours held constant. The effect appears to increase when more variables are included in 
the model. The reason for this price distinction along gender lines in unclear, although other 
research has indicated that females may receive preferential treatment within illicit substance 
markets. Women are thought to hold a significant amount of social capital. This may include, 
but is not limited to, a women’s lower affinity to violence (Anderson, 2001), more stable 
payment behaviour (Anderson, 2005) and the provision of shelter and protection to drug users 
and dealers (Anderson, 2005). Dealers have been observed to compete for women as clients 
by giving favourable transaction terms and a high-quality product (Anderson, 2005).  
The discount in prices paid by women is disconcerting in light of the numerous studies which 
show that women are more vulnerable to the negative physiological effects of 
methamphetamine use (Centre for Substance Abuse Treatment, 2009). While the research is 
limited in this area, Liechti et al. (2001) observe that the intensity of the desired psychoactive 
effects of methamphetamine is higher for women than for men. Women also experience 
increased negative side-effects, are more likely to develop dependencies and risk negative 
birth outcomes if the substance is consumed during pregnancy (Centre for Substance Abuse 
Treatment, 2009).   
Social capital from dealer loyalty does not appear to lead to more favourable prices. 
Purchasing methamphetamine from the same person is associated with lower prices, but this 
effect is not significant and no conclusive evidence can be drawn from this association.  
The prevalence of in-kind payments was tested on this model through the inclusion of a sex-
for-drugs variable as well as a variable indicating whether the respondent had stolen to pay 
for illicit substances. Neither of these variables proved significant in the model specification. 
This was then extended to include an interaction term between sex-for-drugs and gender. The 
interaction terms also showed no significance; they were subsequently excluded from the 
model. It should be noted that the insignificance of this variable may have occurred as a 
result of respondents are sensitive to revealing whether they used sexual favours or theft as a 
means to acquire illicit substances, and may have responded untruthfully. To mitigate against 
this effect in future surveys of a similar nature, one could look to techniques for collecting 
sensitive data, for example, Randomised Response technique (Warner, 1965 ;Blair, Imai and 
Zhou, 2015) 
Neither being employed nor the quadratic term for age is significantly associated with 




and were found to be only weakly jointly significant (p = 0.15). The relationship between age 
and the price purchased follows a concave down, quadratic function which has a turning 
point at approximately 17 years of age. At this point the price relative to age increases by 
greater percentage per year. This may indicate a tendency for dealers to offer youth lower 
prices for the substance to attract them to begin using methamphetamine. This would be an 
astute growth strategy for the dealer since they have the potential to increase the price as 
consumers grows older and becomes increasingly dependent on the substance. A further 
variable indicating the length of drug use was tested under the hypothesis that experience has 
a role to play in transaction efficiency (Lakhdar, 2013). However, the variable was excluded 
from the final model because of the combination of high collinearity with the variable for age 
and relative insignificance when age was excluded. The variable for age was more effective 
in explaining drug-use tenure.  
The perception of a high quality product being bought is weakly significant and is associated 
with an increase in price. Since buyers do not know the actual quality of the product until 
they use it, they may suspect that the dealer may not be disclosing the true level of purity. 
The ‘Expected Purity Hypothesis’ argued by Caulkins (1994) does not appear to apply to the 
current context. This hypothesis proposes that a consumer’s perception of purity and potency 
is the key factor influencing drug prices. The low significance rather indicates that a ‘market 
for lemons’ is prevalent in the sale of methamphetamine. Dealers selling low quality 
methamphetamine are better off selling low quality drugs at a higher price, as this may signal 
high quality, and larger profit margins accrue to the dealer. This creates a moral hazard and 
the use of price to signal purity becomes wholly unreliable. The result is that users cannot 
know the true quality based on price or perceived purity. There is additional uncertainty 
about the true quality since the drug quality is largely unknown even to the seller since, prior 
to the sale reported by respondents, the substance would have been sold through a chain of 
dealers and at each point after manufacture there is the possibility of undisclosed dilution of 
the drug (Caulkins, 2006). This makes the observation and perception of purity difficult for 
substance users and is likely to contribute to the low significance of perceived purity in the 
model.  
Respondents who rely on income from illegal activities, and those receiving handouts, are 
associated with paying lower prices when purchasing methamphetamine; however, this is a 
weakly significant relationship. The base case in this scenario – income from employment – 




family-dependent counterparts. Those reliant on family and friends for income are estimated 
to pay significantly more for methamphetamine than other groupings of income source. 
Compared to those relying on employment for income, those relying on friends and family 
are estimated to pay a price premium of 20%.  
Previous research has identified that individuals with stable sources of income are favoured 
by dealers and may be able to access illicit substances at lower prices (Anderson, 2005). As 
reliance on friends and family is a highly unreliable and sporadic source of income, this gives 
some support to this hypothesis. However, by this argument, those receiving handouts should 
also be classified as unreliable, yet they do not appear to pay a premium for 
methamphetamine. Previous studies have indicated that sellers of illicit substances do not 
always behave in a profit-maximising manner in their businesses, but have the tendency to 
sell at reduced prices to those they know are worse off (McKenna, 2014; Dwyer and Moore, 
2010). They are also observed to assist other dealers when they are unable to access well-
priced drugs to sell on. This behaviour may explain why other dealers and those relying on 
handouts do not pay a premium for drugs.  
Selling illicit substances in public places is expected to increase the risk and, therefore, the 
price of methamphetamine. Increasing the risk of selling a product is hypothesised to increase 
a supplier’s cost of bringing goods to the market, leading to increased prices, in a similar way 
that increasing inputs would influence the price. In illicit markets, transactions made in an 
area where law enforcement is strong are thought to incur higher prices as they incorporate 
the risk of arrest and prosecution into prices (Reuter and Kleinman, 1985). However, the 
model estimated here indicates the opposite. This may be a failure of the hypothesis or a 
failure of law enforcement practices to significantly increasing the risks of selling illicit 
substances in public areas, enough to increase costs.   
7.4.2. Methaqualone (Mandrax) 
The number of methaqualone users in the sample is considerably smaller than that of 
methamphetamine users and there are no prices reported for methaqualone in Khayelitsha. As 
with the analysis of methamphetamine prices paid, an OLS regression was used to determine 
the ceteris paribus effect associated with various demographic groups and the price paid for 
methaqualone. Probability weights were assigned to individual observations to mitigate the 
resultant sampling bias arising from differences in the network size of respondents. 




regression analysis of the price of methaqualone across population groups are shown in table 
21.  
Table 21 Multivariate OLS regression showing the association of population characteristics and 
methaqualone retail prices in the Western Cape region of South Africa 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Log (price of methaqualone half-tablet) 
     
Log (income) 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Employed -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Highly addicted -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Age -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Age squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Years of use 0.01** 0.00 0.01* 0.01** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Female 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
High purity 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
Race     
Black  0.02 0.02 0.04 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Bought from same person  0.07** 0.07 0.08** 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Bought in public   -0.03 -0.02 
   (0.07) (0.07) 
Source of income     
Friends & Family    0.01 
    (0.05) 
Illegal Source    0.03 
    (0.05) 
Grant    0.02 
    (0.05) 
Handout    0.07 
    (0.05) 
Site     
Greenpoint 0.22*** 0.21*** 0.23*** 0.18*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) 
Constant 3.55*** 3.40*** 3.40*** 3.35*** 
 (0.26) (0.27) (0.26) (0.27) 
     
Observations 81 81 81 80 
R-squared 0.46 0.51 0.52 0.55 
Standard errors in parentheses 




The sample size in the estimation of the model in Table 21 is far smaller than that of 
methamphetamine. This is intensified from the non-response for the methaqualone price 
variable from respondents in Khayelitsha. The model appears to explain a large proportion of 
the variation in prices value through the linear regression model estimated above (R-squared 
is far higher than the model estimated for methamphetamine) although this is mostly driven 
by the geographic variable.  
The difference in the price paid for methaqualone is significantly different between Delft and 
Greenpoint and there appears to be a unique ‘going rate’ price at each site. Greenpoint 
respondents were predicted to pay prices that are, on average, 27% higher than users in Delft. 
Apart from the sharp difference between the prices paid at these two sites, there is very little 
variation in the price for a half-tablet. This may be a result of the inability to change the 
quality of the product substantially by cutting resulting in a more standardised product.  
The number of years an individual used methaqualone is significant and predicts a 1% 
increase in the price paid for a half-tablet for every additional year of mandrax use. The 
variable indicating whether the purchase was made from the same person is significant and 
indicates a premium of 7% associated with repeated transactions with a familiar dealer. This 
does not support the hypothesis that dealers charge more for unknown individuals (Chalmers 
and Bradford, 2013) as was expected. Other variables in the model are not significant and are 
negligible in size.  
7.4.3. Heroin 
The total number of data points for the price of heroin is 44 and these data represent 
respondents from Delft and Greenpoint. In addition to a small sample size, there is also very 
little variance in the price data. In Delft (n=15), 93% of the heroin-using respondents reported 
a price of exactly R 30 for the substance. In Greenpoint (n=29), the price of heroin was more 
varied, with the price most frequently reported as R 30, R25 or R20. Because of the small 







This study has covered new ground in the South African illicit psychostimulant economy by 
performing a detailed analysis on the characteristics, initiation pathways and transaction 
prices paid for the more commonly used psychostimulant substances amongst low-income 
individuals in the Western Cape. Psychostimulant use is associated with a myriad of negative 
side effects including risks to public safety, lower productivity levels, health complications, 
environmental degradation and the potential to threaten governance. Therefore, it is 
imperative that the consumption of illicit substances is understood so that optimal 
mechanisms for mitigating the aforementioned effects can be developed and implemented.  
The data for this research were extracted using the RDS technique for sampling hidden 
populations. The sample consisted of poly-substance users from the Western Cape Province, 
where there are estimated to be the highest number of psychostimulant users in South Africa 
(Peltzer et al., 2010). Respondents reported the age at which they began using each substance, 
the analysis of which only provided inconclusive evidence for the ‘gateway hypothesis’ 
proposed by Kandel (1992). We do observe that many current poly-substance users began 
using marijuana before alcohol and hard drugs which is not in alignment with Kandel’s 
hypothesis. However, very few respondents used a ‘hard’ drug as an initial substance, 
evidence that less harmful and more accessible substances were being consumed first, which 
is more consistent with Kandel’s hypothesis. It was also observed that methamphetamine is 
increasingly being used as the first ‘hard’ substance, which aligns to other local literature.  
The price data were used to understand how individual transactions are priced across 
observable purchaser characteristics, location and perceived quality. There were sufficient 
data for analysis for methamphetamine, methaqualone (mandrax) and heroin; although the 
use of methaqualone and heroin in one of the sites was too low for analysis. The sample of 
drug users from three regions shows that, for methamphetamine, there appears to be a 
significant difference in the prices paid according to gender, region and for other observable 
demographic characteristics such as age, employment status and race. For methaqualone, 
prices tend to differ between the locations where the drug was sold but observable client 
characteristics do not influence price significantly. This may largely be due to the inability to 
alter the product’s quality because it is sold in tablet form. While the bivariate analysis shows 




analysis of this difference owing to the small sample size of heroin users; therefore, evidence 
of regional differences in the price for heroin is apparent in the bivariate cross-tabulations but 
it would require more data to model this effect holding other variables constant.  
The occurrence of price differentials for transactions with close geographic proximity is 
similar to the findings of Caulkins (2006) and Lahaie et al. (2015). This is a likely to be a 
result of high transit costs incurred by suppliers (as drugs cannot be transported openly), high 
search costs incurred by consumers and the prevalence of information asymmetries between 
regions. Asymmetrical information also exists between buyer and seller; therefore, dealers 
may charge more for a product if they believe their customer is not aware of the ‘going rate’ 
or if they are expected to have a higher ‘willingness to pay’. Furthermore, since dealers are 
uncertain of the type of customer they are dealing with, they may give preferential prices to 
repeat customers, customers possessing social capital with the dealer or those whom the 
dealer has assessed to be ‘good’ customers. This is found to be most noticeable in the way 
females pay significantly lower prices for methamphetamine. This research has highlighted 
the need to pay close attention to the rise in substance use, particularly among the youth and 
women. Dealers of illicit substances that can be ‘cut’ (e.g. methamphetamine and heroin) are 
able to manipulate prices for favoured customers as well as a means to attract new customers. 
It is imperative that these population groups are protected through improving access to 
opportunities and other demand reduction strategies The UNODC recommends strategies 
targeting families to be most effective for targeting the youth, but also discuss schools 
initiatives and employment initiatives (UNODC, 2017).  
This study has shown resilience to increasing nominal prices for illicit substances. This 
highlights the need for an acceleration of current efforts to reduce supply and demand, 
considering, in particular, the needs and challenges of unemployed and low-income users. 
This finding, as well as the complexity and magnitude of the substance economy, contrasts 
the notions that the rising numbers of illicit substance-related arrests are an indicator of 
regulatory ‘success’. This puts into question this measure of success, as the market prevails 
with unscathed accessibility of illicit substances at relatively constant nominal prices.  
Furthermore, the complexity of the economy indicates that there can be no single policy or 
regulatory response to serve all local sub-market contexts. South Africa’s history has resulted 
in differing contexts between provinces, cities, and even nearby suburbs within a city. The 




by focusing on localised, community-orientated responses such as treatment centres, 
education in schools and for families, and social development. 
This research serves as a precursory step to further analysis of the illicit substance economy. 
A salient message arising from this study is the need to attend to the complexity of the illicit 
substance economy. The finding show how this market system is dynamic, responsive and 
resilient. There are anticipated shortcomings of over-simplifying the analysis or using 
traditional economic theory to a system where the prices of a transaction have many 
structural and behavioural influences.  
There is a need for more data on the drug economy in South Africa in order to attempt to 
resolve the societal ills that the widespread use of drugs produces. This RDS technique is an 
effective way to collect data from hidden populations of low-income drug users (Burnhams et 
al., 2016). For future data collection on the South African drug economy, an inclusion of 
additional economic variables would be beneficial. This is so that important foundations to 
understanding the substance economy – such as the price elasticity of demand – can be 
calculated. Furthermore, an accurate measure of the amount of drugs purchased within a time 
period (e.g. the number of methamphetamine ‘bankies’ purchased in the previous week) 
would be useful as well as an indication of the price paid for each of the weekly purchases. A 
variable indicating the total amount spent on drugs in a set time period (for example, the total 
amount spent on drugs in the past month) would be useful to compare to the total monthly 
income a person receives.   
A qualitative analysis of the interactions between male and female drug users and dealers 
would be a valuable extension of the findings of this research. Understanding how females 
are viewed in the context of the marketplace for psychostimulant substances is of interest, 
particularly in light of the different roles played in society and the varying levels of 
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Appendix I: Assumptions for price data cleaning 
The responses to survey questions relating to the price and purity of a particular substance 
were cleaned in the process of data preparation before analysis. The cleaning process 
included the following refinements:  
 The mid-point of any range provided was used. 
 Methamphetamine and heroin were sold in grams and per serving amounts; a dummy 
variable was created to indicate which of the two options was being reported. 
 Outliers were removed. Due to the phrasing of the question, it appears that some 
respondents gave an aggregated price response instead of a ‘per serving’ response; in 
this case these observations were set to missing. Since ‘per serving’ prices typically 
fall between the range R20-R50, observations falling outside two standard deviations 
of the mean were also set to missing. The final range of acceptable responses for a 
‘per use’ amount of methamphetamine is between R 0 and R 108,68.  
 
